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Actual Agreement, Shared Meaning 
Analysis, and the Invalidation of Boilerplate: 
A Response to Professors Kar and Radin 
Steven W. Feldman* 
 “While new commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new situ-
ations, it has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract.”1   
ABSTRACT 
In their February 2019 article in the Harvard Law Review, Pseudo-Con-
tract And Shared Meaning Analysis, Professors Robin Bradley Kar and Mar-
garet Jane Radin argued that, notwithstanding its physical presence in the doc-
ument (or on a computer screen), boilerplate without actual agreement lacks 
contractual force.  
The authors advocated the technique of shared meaning analysis as a so-
lution to the challenges presented by boilerplate contracts.  By referring to 
“shared meaning,” Kar and Radin proposed that courts enforce “[t]he mean-
ing that parties produce and agree to during contract formation that is most 
consistent with the presupposition that both were using language cooperatively 
to form a contract.” 
I recommend that courts and legislatures reject shared meaning analysis.  
The likely practical ramifications of this empirically untested proposal – which 
is designed to delete numerous boilerplate contract terms – would be the roil-
ing of markets by precluding buyers and sellers from maintaining confidence 
in their agreements.  The current system provides more effective measures to 
safeguard private ordering. 
  
  
* Of Counsel, Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne, Huntsville, Alabama. J.D., Vanderbilt Uni-
versity.  Thanks to Rob Kar, David Horton and Jeff Lipshaw for their incisive com-
ments on earlier drafts.  Special thanks to my wife, Gayla Feldman, for her love and 
support.  Kudos to the staff members of the Missouri Law Review for their outstanding 
editorial support. 
 1.  Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Analyzing a difficult subject that “pervades” contract law and that is “vi-
tal” to the national economy,2  scholars have produced scores of articles about 
the legal and societal aspects of boilerplate contract terms.3    Professors Robin 
Bradley Kar and Margaret Jane Radin contributed to the conversation with their 
February 2019 article in the Harvard Law Review, Pseudo-Contract And 
Shared Meaning Analysis.4  The authors argued that, notwithstanding its phys-
ical presence in the document (or on a computer screen),5 boilerplate without 
actual agreement lacks contractual force.6  The authors claimed that the wide-
spread use of pseudo-contracts and their “fake terms” invited “burgeoning 
forms of [consumer] deception.”7  To Kar and Radin, the prevalence of boiler-
plate has so undermined mutual assent that it has jeopardized the legitimacy of 
contract itself.8 
The authors advocated the technique of shared meaning analysis as a so-
lution to the challenges presented by boilerplate contracts.  By referring to 
“shared meaning,” Kar and Radin  proposed that courts enforce ”[t]he meaning 
  
 2. See, e.g., Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism, The 
Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 26, 27 (2012) 
(“There is little doubt that the treatment of standard contracts is one of the most im-
portant puzzles facing modern contract law – and perhaps one of the most difficult.” 
Also stating that “Standard form contracts pervade the consumer arena” and that they 
are “vital to the continued functioning of the economy.”); Eyal Zamir, Contract Law 
and Theory: Three Views of the Cathedral, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 2077, 2096 (2014) (“Few 
topics in recent decades have attracted more attention in contract scholarship than 
standard-form contracts, and rightly so.” Also stating, “there is hardly a more pressing 
challenge facing contract law.”). 
 3. The articles addressing standard form contracts are legion and date back more 
than 100 years. See, e.g. Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002); Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 Yale 
L.J. 34 (1917); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion–Some Thoughts About Free-
dom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhe-
sion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983); W. David Slawson, 
Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. 
REV. 529 (1971). 
 4. 132 HARV. L. REV. 1135 (2019).  Robin Bradley Kar is Professor of Law and 
Philosophy at the University of Illinois.  Margaret Jane Radin is Professor of Law at 
the University of Toronto and Professor of Law Emerita at both Stanford University 
and the University of Michigan. 
 5. Id. at 1138.  
 6. Id. at 1139–40. 
 7. Id. at 1140. 
 8. “We define ‘boilerplate text’ as any preformatted text that is provided to 
multiple parties or on multiple occasions or both during contract formation.” Id. at 
1219 n.8. 
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that parties produce and agree to during contract formation that is most con-
sistent with the  presupposition  that  both  were  using  language cooper-
atively to form a contract.”9  The authors’ legal theory for addressing unen-
forceable boilerplate was not reformation, where the moving party seeks a con-
tract adjustment to ameliorate a mistake or fraud,10  nor was it severance, where 
a party seeks to remove illegal terms – such as those that offend public policy.11  
Instead, the authors contended that much boilerplate should be judicially ex-
cised from the contract because it is usually outside the bounds of the parties’ 
actual agreement.12   
The authors declared that shared meaning analysis has a strong foundation 
in the traditional principles of contract interpretation, but that it also operates 
in a more refined way.13  Kar and Radin believe that their “[d]efinition of 
shared meaning captures the most important considerations that have guided 
courts and helped them to discern the common meaning of the parties for cen-
turies . . .”14  In the authors’ opinion, linguistics has much to offer in solving 
difficult matters of contract interpretation.15  Kar and Radin argued, “Contract 
. . . has in many instances become pseudo-contract – a system of private obli-
gations with expanding contents that are created unilaterally by one party.”16   
Thus, the authors urged courts to adopt shared meaning analysis in place of the 
current judicial norms of contractual interpretation.17 
I respectfully suggest that Kar and Radin’s article is doctrinally and nor-
matively unpersuasive,18 most notably regarding its suggested approach to the 
  
 9. Id. at 1143, 1146, 1160, 1167, 1216 (adding qualification that the presupposi-
tion holds “even if one party was not acting fully cooperatively so long as the 
presupposition was warranted.”).     
 10. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 440–41 (2011) (explaining refor-
mation). 
 11. 1 SAMUEL L. WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 
19:70 (4th ed. 2019) (explaining severance). 
 12. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1166–68. 
 13. Id. at 1166.  
 14. Id. at 1143 (emphasis added).   
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. at 1140.   
 17. Id. at 1215 (“Shared meaning analysis . . . is grounded in core contract law 
principles and has sufficient scope and flexibility to solve many of the problems high-
lighted in this Article.”). 
 18. In various ways, Kar and Radin rely on Professor Radin’s book, BOILERPLATE: 
THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW (2014).  For my critique of 
this book, which carries over in relevant part to the authors’ present article, especially 
Part IX, see Steven W. Feldman, Mutual Assent, Normative Degradation, and Mass 
Market Standard Form Contracts—A Two-Part Critique of Boilerplate: The Fine Print, 
Vanishing Rights and the Rule of Law (Part I), 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373 (2014). 
4
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use of linguistics.19  Because the authors have made a largely doctrinal argu-
ment in support of shared meaning analysis, I have made a largely doctrinal 
response opposing the validity of their reform.20  Their proposal raises many 
other concerns as discussed below. 
While no thoughtful proposal on contract doctrine should be rejected out 
of hand, my chief concern is any new approach must be rooted in the funda-
mental doctrines of contract law to have a fair chance of adoption.  As will be 
shown, the traditional principles of contract as consistently implemented by the 
great majority of courts lend no support for the authors’ suggestion that the law 
for “centuries” has comported with actual agreement and shared meaning anal-
ysis.21 
The authors’ proposed concept also clashes with the essential precepts of 
contract including the objective standard of contract, freedom of contract, and 
the duty to read and understand a contract.  The likely practical ramifications 
of this empirically untested proposal – which is designed to delete numerous 
boilerplate contract terms – would be the roiling of markets by precluding buy-
ers and sellers from maintaining confidence in their agreements.  The inevitable 
consequence of Kar and Radin’s sea change would be to undermine the two 
goals of contract, which are first, enforcing the contract accepted by the parties 
and second, ensuring the stability, certainty, and predictability of contract.  For 
all these reasons, I recommend that courts and legislatures reject shared mean-
ing analysis.  The current system provides more effective measures in safe-
guarding private ordering.  
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II summarizes the authors’ exten-
sive and detailed argument.  Part III disputes Kar and Radin’s reliance on lin-
guistics as a valid aid to contract interpretation.  Part IV discusses the authors’ 
definition and classification of standardized contracts and explains the benefits 
and detriments for the commercial system.  Part V addresses whether contract 
law has kept pace with twenty first century communications technology.  Part 
VI considers the authors’ argument about the centrality of “actual agreement” 
and “shared meaning analysis” for contract interpretation.  This Part is the heart 
of the Article and covers the goals and components of shared meaning analysis: 
cooperation and good faith during contract formation; the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts and the “common meaning” of the parties; the courts and 
“common meaning” of the parties; the competing standards of mutual assent; 
the objective and subjective theories; how much sharing is needed for shared 
  
 19. Kar and Radin are not saying basic contract law should be different based on 
shared meaning analysis. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1215.  Rather, they are con-
tending that shared meaning analysis comports with the first principles of contract in-
terpretation, but that courts and theorists have departed from its premises. Id. (arguing 
that “assimilationist” approaches “reduce” and even “eviscerat[e] the traditional re-
quirement of actual agreement.”).  This Article will show the converse is true about 
which position is undermining the first principles of contract interpretation. 
 20. The authors assert that their proposal “raises a complex blend of linguistic, 
factual, conceptual, normative and doctrinal problems.” Id. at 1137. 
 21. Id. at 1140, 1143. 
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meaning; and the ramifications of shared meaning analysis.  Part VII covers 
shared meaning analysis and freedom of contract.  Part VIII considers shared 
meaning analysis and a party’s duty to read a contract.  Part IX addresses the 
precedents challenging the use of boilerplate in contrast to the majority view.   
Based on the first principles of contract formation and interpretation, the ma-
jority view better reconciles the conflicting precedents in favor of the current 
system. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF “PSEUDO-CONTRACT AND SHARED MEANING 
ANALYSIS” 
A detailed overview of Kar and Radin’s eighty-five-page article will aid 
the discussion.  Subtopics in this part include: Pseudo Contract and the Assim-
ilationists, Shared Meaning Analysis, The Authors and Neo-Gricean Linguis-
tics, and The Aims of Shared Meaning Analysis. 
A.  Pseudo-Contract and the Assimilationists 
Kar and Radin first argued that an incremental but relentless “paradigm 
slip” has occurred where the widespread use of boilerplate over the last few 
decades has adversely transformed the nature of contracting.22  The authors 
contended that, in terms of sufficiency to bind consumers, contract law has 
inappropriately moved from consent to assent, then from assent to fictive/hy-
pothetical assent, and lastly from hypothetical assent to the purchaser’s fic-
tional or constructive notice.23 
Kar and Radin argued, “Lacking any sound reason to replace contract, we 
must seek better methods of evaluating boilerplate text so as to bring contract 
law back into coherence with its core concepts, principles, and justifications.”24  
The result of this doctrinal tipping point is “pseudo-contract” – an oppressive 
regime of boilerplate with only limited defenses to enforcement, such as un-
conscionability, duress, and illegality.25  Otherwise, the authors argued that 
sellers have free rein to impose upon consumers highly detailed and heavily 
one-sided contract terms.26  Indeed, Kar and Radin emphasized that the seller 
fully knows and expects that the typical consumer will sign (or click) without 
  
 22. Id. at 1137.  
 23. Id. at 1139–40. 
 24. Id. at 1142. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Kar and Radin assert that shared meaning analysis applies to all contracts. Id. 
at 1182.  Because the authors devote most of their attention to consumer contracts, this 
Article will do the same. 
6
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reading the copious terms or having a subjective understanding of the transac-
tion.27  
Kar and Radin believe pseudo-contract distorts core contract law con-
cepts, such as “assent,” “agreement,” and “interpretation.”28  This distortion 
now allows businesses to create legal obligations unilaterally without obtaining 
any actual agreement over many boilerplate terms.29  While the authors 
acknowledged that “Boilerplate is not necessarily pseudo-contract,” they still 
maintained that “[a] great deal of contemporary boilerplate text has become 
pseudo-contractual.”30   
The authors heavily criticized “assimilationist” courts and commentators 
whom they accused of defending the status quo on boilerplate and mutual as-
sent.31  The major problem with assimilationists, the authors claimed, is that 
they hold fast to nineteenth century contract doctrine in adjudicating the en-
forceability of the twenty first century’s new mode: digital contracts.32  As a 
result, the authors argued assimilationist theory has failed from both a “linguis-
tic and normative point of view” because the law has yet to recognize the full 
depths of how much the “changes in technology” changed how people com-
municate.33  In a recurring theme, Kar and Radin argued that the slow, incre-
mental transformation of contract into fake contracts – called a “paradigm slip” 
  
 27. Id. at 1196 (“businesses now have incentives to make use of extensive pseudo-
contractual text to take advantage of consumers’ rationality in not reading an over-
whelming amount of boilerplate text”) (emphasis omitted). 
 28. Id. at 1214.   
 29. Id. at 1137.  Although Kar and Radin are correct that merchants commonly 
draft the terms unilaterally, the contracts are formed bilaterally because the parties 
make reciprocal promises, i.e., payment of money for services rendered or goods de-
livered. See Bilateral Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 30. Id. at 1137–38 (asserting high-end boilerplate contracts between sophisticated 
parties are frequently contractual but the opposite conclusion applies to unread and un-
readable boilerplate in consumer transactions). 
 31. “We define as ‘assimilationist’ as any court or theorist who treats all boiler-
plate as part of a ‘contract’ so long as it is delivered with actual or merely constructive 
‘notice’ to a party who agrees to a more basic transaction.’” Id. at 1139. 
 32. “[T]echnological changes [are] transforming the uses of digital and written 
text and methods of communication in ways that [are]  novel enough, and complex 
enough, that many courts [ a r e ]  left without a  c l e a r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  how 
best to extend traditional contract law concepts and principles to these rapidly 
evolving settings.” Id. at 1173. 
 33. Id. at 1144; see also id. at 1140 (“The fake ‘terms’ in a regime of pseudo-
contract invite burgeoning forms of deception that are difficult for courts to discern 
because they are hidden under the mantle of “contract.”). 
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34 – has further facilitated a “fundamental break” from centuries of case law 
requiring contracts to be “significantly” grounded in “actual agreement.”35  
B.  Shared Meaning Analysis 
By referring to a “shared meaning,” Kar and Radin advocated that courts 
enforce “[t]he meaning that parties produce and agree to during contract for-
mation that is most consistent with the presupposition that both were using 
language cooperatively to form a contract.”36  According to Kar and Radin, 
their adaptation of “shared meaning analysis” is “consistent with long-standing 
approaches.”37  Thus, the authors contended that their formulation re-estab-
lishes the essence of contract such that the courts need to disregard all the non-
consensual boilerplate found in modern contracts, except where the parties 
have reached actual agreement on specific boilerplate terms.38  
The authors also argued that absent actual agreement that was freely 
reached, enforcing these pseudo-contracts violates the weaker party’s freedom 
of contract.39  In Kar and Radin’s proposal, “freedom of contract” contemplates 
parties with equal capacities where the parties expect they will each realize 
expected gain.40  Parties have this freedom only where they are able to safely 
trust that a “well-functioning legal system” will focus legal enforcement on 
“shared agreements.”41  These circumstances are said to be lacking in the mod-
ern contracting system, and the result is the purchaser’s loss of liberty in con-
tracting.42 
Kar and Radin called the non-consensual boilerplate that accompanies the 
actual agreement “ride along” terms.43  The authors contended that such boil-
erplate provisions can be non-contractual even where they physically appear in 
  
 34. A “paradigm slip” in this context means that although the law strives to main-
tain the basic concepts of contract law, the result is a largely unintended drift, mostly 
unnoticed, and a deviation from fundamental doctrinal principles. Id. at 1141–42.  They 
contrast this concept with a “paradigm shift” which is related to a “paradigm slip” ex-
cept that in the former the proponent consciously intends a fundamental shift.  Id. 
 35. Id. at 1142, 1143, 1169, 1173. 
 36. Id. at 1143, 1146, 1160, 1167, 1216 (adding qualification that the presupposi-
tion holds “even if one party was not acting fully cooperatively so long as the 
presupposition was warranted.”).     
 37. Id. at 1143. 
 38. Id. at 1213. 
 39. Id. at 1161.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 1125 
 43. Id. at 1207, 1209.  Boilerplate has contractual status only when it contributes 
shared meaning to the contract or the actual agreement. Id. at 1143.  With online con-
tracts, the parties can still clearly desire to form a contract and reach an actual agree-
ment – but Kar and Radin say that the pact does not necessarily include copious pages 
8
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the contract’s terms and conditions.44  Accordingly, Kar and Radin believe 
terms that are merely informational and absent from the offer/acceptance pro-
cess are within this ride-along category and cannot be used against the con-
sumer. 45  
The authors were aware much boilerplate goes unread by the consumer, 
and this fact provided the impetus for their thesis.46  Where the purchaser nei-
ther reads the term nor approves it as part of contract formation, the authors 
posited these terms should never be deemed part of the actual agreement.47  
Thus, “contract meaning” depends on linguistic cooperation – often in ways 
that are “[s] ubtle and difficult to recognize.”48 
C.  The Authors and Neo-Gricean Linguistics 
To lend additional appeal for their reform and to convince courts that 
shared meaning analysis has doctrinal and normative superiority to assimila-
tionist approaches, the authors relied on the philosophy of language as ex-
pounded by the linguist Paul Grice, a pioneer in syntax and semantics.49  For 
Kar and Radin, neo-Gricean linguistics is central – not tangential – to contract 
interpretation.50  Grice primarily distinguished what words and sentences mean 
under their dictionary definitions versus what individuals mean when they use 
language to communicate in a particular context.51  However, Grice did not 
seek to stamp his brand of linguistics upon contract interpretation and hence 
the term, “Neo-Gricean model of shared meaning analysis,” refers to Kar and 
Radin’s attempt to take Grice’s model out of context.52  
  
of text included by hyperlink. Id. at 1210.  The authors make numerous references to 
contracts that have “copious” amounts of boilerplate but where used, boilerplate often 
consists of just a few pages. See, e.g., Sample Timber Sale Contract, AM. FOREST 
FOUND.: MY LAND PLAN, https://mylandplan.org/content/sample-timber-sale-contract 
[perma.cc/V4QB-FF9Y] (timber sale contract) (last visited June 29, 2019). 
 44. Kar and Radin, supra note 4, at 1194. 
 45. Id. at 1163. 
 46. Id. at 1198.  
 47. Id. at 1174. 
 48. Id. at 1156. 
 49. Id. at 1142.  
 50. Id. at 1144–45.  
 51. A good illustration of speaker meaning versus sentence meaning would be 
where a law professor states in writing a letter of recommendation for a third-year stu-
dent seeking a judicial clerkship, “I support John Doe’s application for a clerkship in 
your chambers. He has perfect class attendance and presents a well-groomed appear-
ance.”  The reference’s reliance on irrelevant considerations and the absence of reliance 
on the expected issues of John Doe’s command of legal scholarship and general legal 
ability send an implied message that the law professor has little confidence in John 
Doe’s candidacy. See id. at 1147 (offering a similar example). 
 52. Id. at 1145–46.  
9
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Grice also postulated the existence of conversational implicatures.  These 
devices illustrate the distinction between what a speaker says and what he im-
plies in light of the circumstances surrounding the communication.53  These 
“implicatures” occur where the parties implicitly pre-suppose and rely upon 
cooperative norms that govern interpersonal exchanges.54  The Gricean con-
struct emphasizes that language properly understood exists in a social and in-
terpersonal context as opposed to an abstract setting.55 
Building upon Gricean doctrine, Kar and Radin argued that a mode of 
contract interpretation will be inferior when it considers only sentence mean-
ing and logic but omits the more complex ways in which individuals natu-
rally rely on the cooperative norms of language to communicate meaning.56  
While conceding assimilationist doctrine’s “growing influence”57 in resolving 
contract interpretation issues, the authors decried its alleged linguistic inde-
terminacy and absence of linguistic cooperation, which they said precluded 
effective communication.58  Thus, the authors put forth their proposal for 
shared meaning analysis – which they indicated endorses neither the objective 
nor the subjective theory of contractual obligation and interpretation. 59 
“Shared meaning” of a contract occurs when parties produce and actu-
ally agree to terms during contract formation based on the pre-supposition that 
parties speak in social contexts using language cooperatively – as found in var-
ious norms – to form a contract.60  Kar and Radin suggested that the “parties 
cannot both use language cooperatively to agree to enter into a contract and 
  
 53. Id. at 1148.  
 54. Gricean implicatures stem from the “cooperative principle,” which governs 
where the speaker makes his conversational contribution by the accepted purpose or 
direction of the talk exchange in which he is engaged.  Id. at 1148.  The cooperative 
principle in turn forms the basis of the various maxims or norms of speech engagement 
between the speaker and the listener.  
 55. Id. at 1147, 1216. 
 56. Id. at 1148.   
 57. Id. at 1156 
 58. Id. at 1153–54; see also id. at 1146–48 (a primary linguistic problem with 
assimilationist approaches to boilerplate – as well as other traditional tests for contract 
interpretation – is that they fail to distinguish between sentence meaning, speaker 
meaning, and what the authors have called the shared meaning of a contract). 
 59. See id. at 1143, 1194 (discussing objective/subjective theories of contractual 
theories of party assent). 
 60. Id. at 1146.  Some examples of these norms are (1) The Maxim of Manner, 
which requires clarity and  the avoidance of obscurity, ambiguity, undue length, and 
incoherence, and (2) The Maxim of Quality, which tells parties to avoid contributions 
to conversations that the speaker either believes are false or that lack adequate evidence. 
Id. at 1151.  These so-called “norms” do not fit the dictionary definition of being a 
“general level” or “average.” See Norm, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.diction-
ary.com/browse/norm# [perma.cc/BU7H-7FN3] (last visited June 29, 2019).  These 
norms lack an effective enforcement mechanism and are frequently honored more in 
the breach than in the observance. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1152–53. 
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fail to produce an actual agreement that each is committed to playing his or 
her respective part to perform in good faith.”61  The authors further claimed 
that their model builds upon the “consensus ad idem” (agreement to the same 
thing), which is also the legal basis for the oft-used (and misleadingly-termed) 
formulation of the “meeting of the minds.”62  
D. The Aims of Shared Meaning Analysis 
Kar and Radin’s proposal is no mere refinement of the law in this area.  
The authors’ radical plan is to revamp contract law by replacing its very foun-
dations.  The authors ask a new threshold question: Is  any of the boilerplate 
text in dispute part of an actual agreement that the parties reached when 
they used language to form a contract?63  If there is an excessive amount of 
“ride along” boilerplate that raises a doubt about the sufficiency of the remain-
ing terms of the actual agreement, no enforceable contract would arise.64 
II.  THE USE OF LINGUISTICS IN CONTRACT INTERPRETATION  
Because linguistics occupies such an important place in Kar and Radin’s 
shared meaning analysis, this Part will first focus on the broader issue of the 
relevance and utility of linguistics to contractual interpretation.  As will be 
shown in extensive detail below, the authors’ linkage between linguistics and 
contract lacks merit for several reasons.  Kar and Radin also failed to cite or 
otherwise dispute the views of commentators who have analyzed – and rejected 
– the relation of linguistics and contract generally and the Grice/contract inter-
pretation/intersection specifically.65  
Still deeper – and again unmentioned – issues pervade Kar and Radin’s 
new construct.  As will be analyzed below, these issues are first, the likely 
inadmissibility at trial of shared meaning analysis under the rules of evidence 
and second, the authors’ reliance on linguistics reveals undue favoritism for the 
consumer and little or no regard for the merchant’s valid interests. 
  
 61. Id. at 1152–53. 
 62. Id. at 1154, n.64.  For criticisms of this usage, see 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 
supra note 11, §§ 3:4, 3:5, 4:1, 4.3. 
 63. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1155. 
 64. Id. at 1167–68, 1192; cf. infra notes 294–95 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the requirement for definite contracts). 
 65. See infra Part III.A.  
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A.  Linguistics and Contract Interpretation: A Controversial Relation-
ship 
Linguistics is the science of language and constitutes phonetics, phonol-
ogy, morphology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and historical linguistics.66  
“[I]n the field of corpus linguistics, scholars . . . determine . . . [either] those 
meanings that are consistent with common usage,” or “the term’s ordinary or 
most frequent meaning” based on empirical data rather than personal intui-
tion.67  Regarding the utility of linguistics, the late Professor E. Allan Farns-
worth of the Columbia Law School – former Reporter for the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts and the author of a widely cited three-volume treatise on 
contract law – noted the controversial tie between linguistics and the philoso-
phy of language on the one hand and contract interpretation on the other hand: 
Philosophers and semanticists have debated at length the proper use 
of [these disciplines], if any [in relation to contract interpretation].  
It is tempting to look to these discussions for help in dealing with 
contract language. Most of [these discussions], however, are wide 
of the mark because they concentrate on language as it is used in 
science to describe experience. The concern of the philosopher or 
semanticist is with the truth of such language. The terms of a con-
tract . . . may be similar in form to the laws of science . . . but they 
are fundamentally different in significance.  The language of a con-
tract is directed not at describing experience but at controlling hu-
man behavior, ordinarily the behavior of the contracting parties.  
The concern of a court is not with the truth of the language but with 
the expectations that it aroused in the parties.  It is therefore to these 
expectations, rather than to the concern of the philosopher or se-
manticist, that we must turn in the search for the meaning of con-
tract language.68 
Professor Farnsworth went on to state: 
That is not to say that contract law has no concern for truth.  If the 
seller sells wood as “braziletto,” a court may be called upon to de-
cide whether it is in fact braziletto or peachum. [citation omitted]  
But such questions of fact, which concern truth, arise only after 
  
 66. See Linguistics, THE FREE DICTIONARY, https://www.thefreediction-
ary.com/linguistics [perma.cc/25XL-F4WX] (last visited June 29, 2019). 
 67. Fire Insurance Exchange v. Oltmanns, 416 P.3d 1148, 1163 n.9 (Utah 2018) 
(quoting Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Lin-
guistics as an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L REV. 156, 
160–61 (2012)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 68. 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §7.7 (3d ed. 2004).  
Kar and Radin do not mention or critique Farnsworth’s criticism of the misuse of lin-
guistics. 
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questions of interpretation, which go in part to the expectations of 
the parties, have been answered:  Was the seller bound to deliver 
braziletto rather than peachum?69 
As Professor Farnsworth correctly points out, linguistics is generally un-
helpful in resolving issues of contract interpretation because linguistics focuses 
mainly on the truth of communication whereas the primary point of contract 
law is to control the behavior of the parties.70  In the above passage, Professor 
Farnsworth also acknowledged that contract law does have some concern for 
the truth, such as giving a remedy when a defendant misrepresented the nature 
and quality of goods delivered to the plaintiff, but this issue is a secondary 
concern.  By comparison, Kar and Radin – for both sentence meaning and 
speaker meaning – analyze only truth telling.71 
What is missing from Kar and Radin’s linguistic model is the enforcement 
of the reasonable expectations and behavior of the parties.72  Professor Farns-
worth is not alone in his skepticism about the use of linguistics in the interpre-
tation of legal texts.  Other commentators have observed linguistics is ill-suited 
for understanding contracts because linguistics explains generalizations in the 
structure and use of language but not how language should be used to manage 
contractual expectations and party behavior, which is the point of contract in-
terpretation.73  Other authorities contend that “linguistics may well misunder-
stand the legal process”74 or “get in the way of moral knowledge.”75  Still, other 
  
 69. Id. 
 70. See Lawrence M. Solan, Can the Legal System Use Experts on Meaning?, 66 
TENN. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1999) (noting that linguists analyze and explain generaliza-
tions in the structure and use of language); Id. at 1176 (“It is not the goal of linguistic 
theory to tell people how they should understand language.”).   
 71. See supra Part II (summarizing the elements of the authors’ thesis). 
 72. See Midwest Division-OPRMC, LLC v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Div. of Med. 
Servs., 241 S.W.3d 371, 379 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D 2007) (stating, “with all contracts, the 
courts seek to enforce the reasonable expectations of the parties”). 
 73. Jiri Janko, Note, Linguistically Integrated Contractual Interpretation, 38 
RUTGERS L.J. 601, 628 (2007). 
 74. Id. at 628 (citing Francis J. Mootz III, Desperately Seeking Science, 73 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 1009, 1014–17 (1995)); see also Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seri-
ously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. 
L. REV. 565, 603 (2006) (stating “Grice’s maxims are often vague, and could even be 
contradictory as applied in any given case”); Victoria Nourse, Picking and Choosing 
Text: Lessons for Statutory Interpretation From the Philosophy of Language, 69 FLA. 
L. REV. 1409, 1437 n.40 (2017) (commenting on the “unwieldy and unclear” nature of 
Grice’s maxims). 
 75. Janko, supra note 73, at 628 (citing Michael S. Moore, Plain Meaning and 
Linguistics – A Case Study, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1253, 1261–62 (1995) (arguing that a 
morally desirable meaning should compete with linguistic determination of the ordi-
nary meaning)). 
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writers object to linguists' self-designation of having the utmost expertise in 
the interpretation of ordinary meaning.76 
The authors did not mention or otherwise rebut Professor Farnsworth’s 
conclusion about the poor fit between linguistics and contract interpretation.  
For the reasons given in this section, courts should not enact Paul Grice’s the-
ory of linguistics as part of the law of contract interpretation, especially where 
Grice had no intent that other writers should use his philosophy in that manner. 
B.  Shared Meaning Analysis as Evidence at Trial 
The authors overlooked that shared meaning analysis would be quite chal-
lenging to prove at trial.  For example, subjective evidence provided through 
the testimony by a party on the meaning of a contract is invariably self-serving 
and inherently difficult to verify.77  Accordingly, a party’s testimony of his or 
her prior subjective intent that was not expressed or communicated when the 
contract was formed is not admissible evidence of intent.78  Given these obsta-
cles, it would be very difficult for either party to submit admissible evidence 
of his or her subjective mindset regarding the “actual agreement” unless the 
party had manifested this subjective interpretation to his counterpart during ne-
gotiations.79 
Assuming that the party somehow gets past the above obstacles, another 
major evidentiary weakness of shared meaning analysis is the movant would 
need to use an expert witness to explain this linguistic theory and its application 
to a particular contract.  Shared meaning analysis falls within the category of 
evidence outside the understanding of most factfinders.  Rejecting this type of 
proof, the California Second District Court of Appeal has said, “The opinion 
of a linguist or other expert as to the meaning of contract language is irrelevant 
to the court's task of interpreting the plain language of the contract.”80  This 
principle draws upon the notion that expert testimony of issues of law, either 
in the form of legal conclusions or discussion of the legal implications of evi-
dence, is inadmissible.81  
  
 76. Id. at 628, n. 168. 
 77. SR Int’l. Bus. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. World Trade Center Properties, LLC, 467 F.3d 
107, 127 (2d Cir. 2006); Dugan v. Smerick Sewerage Co., 142 F.3d 398, 403–04 (7th 
Cir. 1998); Apeldyn Corp. v. Eidos, LLC, 943 F. Supp. 2d. 1145, 1149 (D. Or. 2013). 
 78. Apeldyn Corp., 943 F. Supp. 2d. at 1149.  Another bar to judicial consideration 
of a party’s subjective intent is where the evidence arises during settlement discussions. 
See FED. R. EVID. 408 (stating evidence of conduct or a statement made in compromise 
negotiations is not admissible). 
 79. See infra Part VI.E 
 80. See Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 Cal. App. 4th 1206, 1217–18 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2004); CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (insurance policy). 
 81. Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners’ Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 510 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The 
question of interpretation of the contract is for the jury and the question of legal effect 
is for the judge.  In neither case do [courts] permit expert testimony”) (quoting Loeb v. 
14
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The second flaw in Kar and Radin’s use of linguistics is the authors’ bias 
in favor of consumers and against merchants.  Kar and Radin consistently an-
alyzed the concept of “shared meaning” analysis just from the perspective of 
the consumer – who is only one of the two parties to the contract.82  For Kar 
and Radin, the term “speaker meaning,” refers to the consumer because the 
speaker whose views take pre-eminence is always the consumer.83  This em-
phasis on the favored consumer in contract interpretation is incorrect because 
the “mutual intent” of the parties is controlling.84  As the Tennessee Court of 
Appeals has stated, “In construing contracts, the words expressing the parties’ 
intentions should be given their usual, natural and ordinary meaning, and nei-
ther party is to be favored in the construction.”85  The authors’ thesis did not 
sufficiently heed that there are always two speakers – the promisor and a prom-
isee – under a contact and that the voices of both the seller and the buyer merit 
due consideration.86    
In IFC Credit Corp. v. United Business & Industrial Federal Credit Un-
ion,87 then-Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit focused on the harm to the contracting system when a court 
favors one party over another in commercial transactions: 
  
Hammond, 407 F.2d 779, 781 (7th Cir. 1969)); Nieves–Villanueva v. Soto–Rivera, 133 
F.3d 92, 99 (1st Cir. 1997); Sparton Corp. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 1, 8 (2007) 
(stating it is inappropriate to have experts opine as to the legal obligations of the parties 
under contract). 
 82. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1143. 
 83. See, e.g., id. at 1139 (Apple iTunes consumer); id. at 1192–96 (used car pur-
chaser); id. at 1210 (E-book purchase); id. at 1199–1201 (business premises insurance). 
 84. “[T]he fundamental goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the mu-
tual intent of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting.” U.S. Cellular Inv. Co. 
v. GTE Mobilnet, Inc., 281 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 85. Forrest Constr. Co., LLC v. Laughlin, 337 S.W.3d 211, 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2009); Rainey v. Stansell, 836 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis 
added); see also Burke v. Reiter, 42 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Iowa 1950) (“The law knows 
no such thing as a rich man or a poor man, but seeks to treat all alike to the end that 
even justice may be dispensed.”). 
 86. Courts (and commentators) correctly construe reasonable understanding from 
the vantage point of both parties. See, e.g., Int’l Marine Underwriters v. ABCD Marine, 
313 P.3d 395, 399 (Wash. 2013) (the primary objective in contract interpretation “is to 
ascertain the mutual intent of the parties at the time they executed the contract”) (em-
phasis added); see also Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Rea-
sonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293, 334 
(1997) (“The reasonable person is a product of the creative efforts of the promisor and 
promisee. As such, neither party's perspective alone can adequately serve the interpre-
tive mandate of the reasonable person.”) (emphasis added). 
 87. 512 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2008). 
15
Feldman: Actual Agreement, Shared Meaning Analysis, and the Invalidation o
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
726 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol.  84 
As long as the price is negotiable and the customer may shop elsewhere, 
consumer protection comes from competition rather than judicial inter-
vention.  Making the institution of contract unreliable by trying to adjust 
matters ex post in favor of the weaker party will just make weaker par-
ties worse off in the long run.  
. . . . 
The idea that favoring one side or the other in a class of contract dis-
putes can redistribute wealth is one of the most persistent illusions of 
judicial power.  It comes from failing to consider the full consequences 
of legal decisions.  Courts deciding contract cases cannot durably shift 
the balance of advantages to the weaker side of the market; they can 
only make contracts more costly to that side in the future, because [the 
other side] will demand compensation for bearing onerous terms.88 
Regrettably, the merchant’s valid objectives and society’s interests in a 
stable, predictable contracting environment merit little weight in Kar and Ra-
din’s equation.   
III.  BOILERPLATE, STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS, AND ADHESION 
CONTRACTS: DEFINITIONAL ISSUES  
This Part addresses the adequacy of Kar and Radin’s definition of boiler-
plate and their failure to employ established definitions of this concept.  This 
Part also takes issue with their consistently unfavorable treatment of boilerplate 
and failure to cite the many benefits of this staple of commercial relationships.   
A.  The Overly Broad Definition of Boilerplate   
The authors defined “boilerplate text” as “any preformatted text that is 
provided during contract formation to multiple parties, on multiple occasions, 
or both.”89  At best, this formulation is idiosyncratic.  The mere existence of 
preformatted or standardized contract terms alone is benign and not objection-
able; it is the contractual content that determines whether boilerplate facilitates 
or impedes the goals of the contracting system.  Surprisingly, the authors failed 
to mention by name or to explain in any depth the most commonly encountered 
contract type in this area: the so-called contract of adhesion.  These contracts 
incorporate – and go beyond – the elements of ‘boilerplate’ and ‘standard’ 
forms.90  
  
 88. Id. at 993 (quoting Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River 
Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 282 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 89. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1139 n.8. 
 90. See Max True Plastering Co. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 864 
(Okla. 1996). 
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Unlike standard form contracts, “adhesion contracts” characteristically 
reflect a definite market advantage in favor of the merchant and his superior 
bargaining power.  A leading decision explains the prevailing understanding of 
adhesion contracts: 
An adhesion contract is a standardized contract prepared entirely by one 
party to the transaction for the acceptance of the other.  These contracts, 
because of the disparity in bargaining power between the draftsman and 
the second party, must be accepted or rejected on a “take it or leave it” 
basis without opportunity for bargaining – the services contracted for 
cannot be obtained except by acquiescing to the form agreement.91 
Contrary to Kar and Radin’s suggestion that “assimilationists” have done 
little to counter the potential adverse impacts of boilerplate, the majority of 
courts give weight to possible merchant misuse of adhesion contracts, which is 
why these jurisdictions scrutinize contracts of adhesion “skeptically.”92  Thus, 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Appeals of West Virginia observed that it gives 
“greater scrutiny” to an adhesive contract.”93  Along similar lines, case law 
from California provides that where a contract limits the duties or liability of 
the stronger party, a court will not enforce it against the weaker party absent 
“plain and clear notification” of the terms and the adherent's “understanding 
consent.”94 Additionally, a boilerplate contract that a merchant offers to con-
sumers on a take it or leave it basis can be procedurally unconscionable.95                    
Next, consider the interpretive maxim of contra proferentem.  Under this 
principle, when a standardized contract between parties of unequal bargaining 
power is ambiguous because it is open to two reasonable interpretations, but 
  
 91. Id.  A standard form contract is similar to, though not identical with, a contract 
of adhesion. See Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 605 A.2d 681, 685 
(N.J. 1992) (stating that the “essential nature of a contract of adhesion is that it is pre-
sented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, commonly in a standardized printed form, without 
opportunity for the ‘adhering’ party to negotiate except perhaps on a few particulars.”).  
Because Kar and Radin are quite concerned with the economic plight of consumers 
when faced with standardized contracts, I believe the authors would similarly be con-
cerned with adhesion contracts. 
 92. Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 52 n.13 (Mich. 2005) (Kelly, J., 
dissenting) (collecting numerous cases applying rule of skepticism). 
 93. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d 217, 228 (W. Va. 2012) (“A 
contract of adhesion should receive greater scrutiny than a contract with bargained-for 
items to determine if it imposes terms that are oppressive, unconscionable or beyond 
the reasonable expectations of an ordinary person.”). 
 94. Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783–84 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1976). 
 95. Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 853 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2001); Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d 217, 227 (W. Va. 2012) 
(stating that procedural unconscionability “often begins with a contract of adhesion”). 
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the use of the established canons of construction fail to resolve the incon-
sistency, a reviewing court may interpret the contract in the manner least fa-
vorable to the merchant as the stronger party who was the drafter of the agree-
ment.96 
The above rules of skepticism in various jurisdictions are in addition to 
the consumer-friendly general doctrine in a number of states that ambiguities 
in an insurance contract are construed in accordance with the reasonable ex-
pectations of the insured.97  Indeed, some decisions go beyond insurance law 
and tilt more strongly in favor of the consumer by making general allowances 
for a consumer’s having a lesser “level of sophistication” when courts deter-
mine the existence of mutual assent.98  Kar and Radin’s omission of these var-
ious consumer-oriented doctrines calls into question the authors’ objections to 
the so-called assimilationist position. 
B.  The Benefits and Detriments of Boilerplate  
In contrast with Kar and Radin’s heavy criticism of consumer contracts 
merely because these instruments have boilerplate terms, courts and commen-
tators have pointed out the value-added nature of boilerplate contracting.  
Courts have acknowledged the benefits of such standardized contracts as 
being part of the “fabric of society.”99  For one, they can eliminate some every-
day frustrations.  As an example, most persons would find it highly annoying 
to stand in a long line at the airport car rental desk where every traveler took 
his time seeking to negotiate a tailored rental car agreement.  To avoid such 
  
 96. Savedoff v. Access Grp., Inc., 524 F.3d 754, 764 (6th Cir. 2008); Ohio Cas. 
Ins. Co. v. Holcim, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1260 (S.D. Ala. 2010). 
 97. See e.g., New Castle Cnty. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 744, 750 (3d 
Cir. 2001); Karnette v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 444 F. Supp. 2d 640, 646–47 
(E.D. Va. 2006).  Some jurisdictions extend the principle to unambiguous insurance 
policies in “exceptional” cases. See Mitchell v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 255 
F. Supp. 2d 487, 494 (E.D. Pa. 2003).  However, courts are divided on this doctrine. 
See Arthur J. Park, What to Reasonably Expect in the Coming Years from the Reason-
able Expectations of the Insured Doctrine, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 165 (2012).  Kar 
and Radin discuss this doctrine but conclude that it is mostly confined to the interpre-
tation of insurance policies. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1201. 
 98. See Wright v. SSC Nashville Operating Co., No. 3:16-cv-00768, 2017 WL 
914586 at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 8, 2017) (ruling that “an individual consumer may be 
held not to have assented in a situation where a more sophisticated commercial entity 
would [have been deemed to concur on the contact].”) (citing Wofford v. M.J. Edwards 
& Sons Funeral Home Inc., 490 S.W.3d 800, 812 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015)).  “An ever-
growing body of case law and scholarship has fashioned a rigid dichotomy between 
sophisticated and unsophisticated parties in a wide array of contract inquiries.” Mere-
dith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO. L. 
REV. 493, 493–94 (2010). 
 99. Goodwin v. Ford Motor Co., 970 F. Supp. 1007, 1015 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (quot-
ing Roberson v. Money Tree of Ala., Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1519, 1528 (M.D. Ala. 1997)). 
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problems, standardization of forms for contracts is a rational and economically 
efficient response to the rapidity of market transactions and the high costs of 
negotiations, such that the drafter can rationally calculate the costs and risks of 
performance.  This process in turn contributes to reasonable pricing.100  The 
Seventh Circuit commented,  
Phrases become boilerplate when many parties find that the language 
serves their ends. That’s a reason to enforce the promises, not to disre-
gard them. 
. . . . 
Contractual language serves its functions only if enforced consistently. 
This is one of the advantages of boilerplate, which usually has a record 
of predictable interpretation and application.101 
Furthermore, the absence of back-and-forth bargaining – as frequently 
occurs with boilerplate contracts – is not necessarily unfair to consumers.  As 
Judge Richard Posner put it, “[W]hat is important is not whether there is hag-
gling in every transaction but whether competition forces sellers to incorporate 
in their standard contracts terms that protect the purchasers.”102 
Indeed, the vast majority of form contract terms deployed in the American 
commercial system are not problematic.  Generally, these boilerplate terms are 
legitimate and reasonable components of the agreement, which means these 
provisions usually are unobjectionable.103  Typically, merchants do not use 
these instruments to oppress consumers as Kar and Radin repeatedly alleged.104  
As a pair of commentators writing in the Columbia Law Review observed: 
For many years, contract literature focused on the idea that sellers with 
market power draft contracts that are disadvantageous to consumers.  
  
 100. 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4 (rev. ed 1993); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 211 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1981)) (“Standardization of 
agreements serves many of the same functions as standardization of goods and services; 
both are essential to a system of mass production and distribution. Scarce and costly 
time and skill can be devoted to a class of transactions rather than the details of indi-
vidual transactions.”); John J. A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Ap-
proach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 289 (2000). 
 101. Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 384–85 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 102. Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in Augmented Reality: The Case of Con-
sumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 711 (2012) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 144 (8th ed. 2011)). 
 103. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS, 348 n.3 (6th 
ed. 2009) (“Probably most contracts of adhesion are simple and reasonable.”). 
 104. See, e.g., Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1140 (“The fake ‘terms’ in a regime 
of pseudo-contract invite burgeoning forms of deception that are difficult for courts to 
discern because they are hidden under the mantle of ‘contract.’”). 
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Law and economics scholars, however, have been skeptical about that 
hypothesis, pointing out that a strategy of dictating pro-seller contract 
terms would rarely be the optimal technique for exploiting market 
power.105   
Professor M.J. Trebilcock has made a similarly well-reasoned economic 
analysis of standard form contracts, concluding: 
[T]he proposition that the use of consumer standard-form contracts is 
the result of the concentration of market power is entirely without fac-
tual foundation. The reason why such contracts are used is . . . to reduce 
transaction costs . . . [S]tandard forms are used (for this reason) in 
countless contexts where no significant degree of market concentration 
exists . . . The fact that in these cases a supplier's products are offered 
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis is evidence not of market power but of a 
recognition that neither producer – nor consumer – interests in aggre-
gate are served by incurring the costs involved in negotiating separately 
every transaction. The use of standard forms is a totally spurious proxy 
for the existence of market power.106 
Kar and Radin did not meaningfully support their theme that boilerplate 
unfairly gives sellers a market advantage over consumers by imposing onerous, 
one-sided terms.107  Nevertheless, to her credit, Radin, in her prior publications, 
did mention the recognized benefits of boilerplate.108  She acknowledged, “In 
the abstract standardization is neither good nor bad,” and she conceded that a 
standardized form can promote knowledge and ease of use, reduce uncertainty, 
and lower transaction costs for all parties.109  She also cited with approval the 
example of perhaps the most prevalent type of standard form contracts – the 
insurance policy – and how it facilitates commercial transactions.110  Radin has 
  
 105. Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeinicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet 
Retail Contracting, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 984–85 (2008).  The actual incidence of 
merchant abuse is far less than indicated by Kar and Radin. Supra note 4, at 1174–75.  
Some experts dispute the frequent contention that corporations misuse boilerplate and 
thereby increase profits and market share. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate 
Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 938 (2006). 
 106. Michael J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-
Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTO L. J. 359, 364 (1976)). 
 107. See e.g., Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1145 (stating businesses often create 
legal obligations “ [ u]nilaterally without obtaining any actual agreement over many 
boilerplate “terms”); id. at 1196 (“market forces have begun to interact with assimila-
tionist legal doctrine to create powerful incentives for businesses systematically to mis-
lead consumers through what is sometimes called careful contract design.”). 
 108. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING 
RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 42 (2014). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  
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repeatedly endorsed the general concept of contract standardization in her prior 
publications111 and no apparent reason exists for her shift in position. 
Despite Kar and Radin’s contention that some boilerplate is unfair and 
borders on being fraudulent,112 case law and many commentators accept that 
form contracts are not “inherently sinister” and “any rule automatically invali-
dating adhesion contracts would be ‘completely unworkable.’”113  The Seventh 
Circuit recognized that no reason existed to treat “adhesion contracts or form 
contracts differently” from other contract types.114  In fact, over the last thirty-
five or so years, “[i]t has been hard to find decisions holding terms invalid on 
the ground that something is wrong with non-negotiable terms in form con-
tracts.”115  
  
 111. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Deformation of Contract in the Information So-
ciety, 37 J. LEGAL STUDIES 534, 543 (2017) (“I am not arguing against standardization, 
nor am I arguing against all standardization in the field of contracts.”); MARGARET J. 
RADIN, supra note 108, at 42 (“Yet, if all attempts to use boilerplate were to be declared 
unenforceable, that would cause a considerable disruption of current commercial prac-
tice.”). 
 112. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 113. Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc, 128 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).  A host 
of prominent commentators rejects the abolition of boilerplate: 
Robert Hillman declares that “because of the efficiencies and benefits of 
standard forms, it is not a reach to predict that the economy would come to 
a screeching halt without them.” Arthur Leff states that living entirely with-
out boilerplate is “commercially absurd” due to “the economics of the mass 
distribution of goods.” Nancy Kim hypothesizes that “failure to recognize 
contracts of adhesion would mean slowing down and perhaps even stifling 
the growth of a valuable industry.” Eric Posner asserts that “[c]ontracts are 
long and detailed by necessity.”  
And David Slawson sums up the consensus: 
The predominance of standard forms is the best evidence of their necessity. 
They are characteristic of a mass production society and an integral part of 
it . . . These services are essential, and if they are to be provided at reason-
able cost, they must be standardized and mass-produced like other goods 
and services in an industrial economy.  
James Gibson, Boilerplate’s False Dichotomy, 106 GEO. L.J. 249, 264 (2019). 
 114. Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc. 883 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 
1989). 
 115. IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 
993 (7th Cir. 2008).  Older cases divided on the propriety of adhesion contracts. Com-
pare Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 147 (Pa. Super. 1985) (“The 
phrase ‘contract of adhesion’ and the evil it suggests have been familiar for many 
years.”), with Klos v. Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 1997) (adhesion contracts 
“offend[] basic notions of civility and fair play”), and Powell v. Cent. Cal. Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Assn., 130 Cal. Rptr. 635, 642 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (“There is nothing sinful 
or illegal about a contract of adhesion.”) and State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 
265, 273 (W. Va. 2002) (the question for courts is distinguishing “good adhesion con-
tracts which should be enforced from bad adhesion contracts which should not.”). 
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While the authors complained that boilerplate unfairly grants sellers a 
substantial economic advantage,116 despite any appeal this fact might have po-
litically or socially, their claim has no legal traction.  Courts consistently rule 
that it is not their place to remedy disparities of wealth in society, the levels of 
information known to each party, or the comparative bargaining skills of buy-
ers and sellers.117  Aggressive bargaining positions alone in boilerplate con-
tracts are proper and advance the objectives of our free market economy.118  
Because nothing inappropriate would result when a merchant simply drafts 
terms that will strongly ensure that the seller would prevail in any litigation 
with a buyer, Kar and Radin’s doctrinal and normative critique of modern-day 
standardized contracting is unpersuasive. 119 
  
 116. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1140. 
 117. See Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Lei Wang, 651 F.3d 678, 683 (7th Cir. 2011) (also 
noting without objection that “[t]here is often an extreme asymmetry of information 
between seller and buyer when the seller is the provider of a professional service.”); 
PXRE Reinsurance Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 342 F. Supp. 2d 752, 761 (N.D. 
Ill. 2004) (“Transactions almost always begin with asymmetry of information, but that 
[fact] does not eliminate the need for the less-informed party to exercise ordinary pru-
dence.”); Eric H. Franklin, Mandating Precontractual Disclosure, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
553, 581 (2013) (arguing that information asymmetry is the norm in contracting). 
 118. Industrial Representatives, Inc. v. CP Clare Corp., 74 F.3d 128, 132 (7th Cir. 
1989) (“Parties to contracts are entitled to seek, and retain, personal advantage; striving 
for that advantage is the source of much economic progress.”); Dick Broad. Co., Inc. 
of Tennessee v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653, 671 (Tenn. 2013) (“[P]arties 
engaged in a commercial transaction pursue their own self-interest and understand and 
expect that the parties with whom they are dealing are doing likewise.”). 
 119. Several commentators have challenged the prevailing view that standard-form 
contracts have eliminated bargaining in consumer contracts.  Citing empirical studies, 
Jason Scott Johnston argued that standard-form contracts “[f]acilitate bargaining and 
are a crucial instrument in the establishment and maintenance of cooperative relation-
ships between firms and their customers.” Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: 
An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotia-
tion Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 858 (2006).  Profes-
sor Johnston studied widely used consumer contracts, including hospital bills, con-
sumer credit cards, home-mortgage and home-equity lending, the rent-to-own industry 
and retail sales return policies. Id. at 864.  Other writers similarly have relied on empir-
ical findings that mass-market boilerplate contracts are much more negotiable in fact 
than they are in theory. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Con-
tracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 828 (2006) (contend-
ing that based on reputational concerns, some merchants selectively enforce standard 
form contracts against purchasers).  Kar and Radin do not mention these empirical find-
ings but merely assume that boilerplate terms are typically non-negotiable. See supra 
note 4, at 1137, 1140. 
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss3/7
2019] BOILERPLATE INVALIDATION 733 
IV.  ASSIMILATIONIST CONTRACT THEORY AND BOILERPLATE: HAS 
THE LAW KEPT PACE WITH TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY?  
Kar and Radin noted the rapid developments in technology that have 
changed how parties communicate to form contracts.120  The authors focused 
on electronic-commerce and clickwrap, browsewrap, and shrinkwrap transac-
tions.121  Thus, even as courts have tried “valiantly” to extend traditional con-
tract law doctrines to the new technology, Kar and Radin asserted that the ju-
diciary has failed to make the transition.122  They contended that courts have 
overlooked the effects of technology, thereby causing a fundamental “break in 
function” in the institution of contract itself.123 
As indicated above, Kar and Radin claimed that courts have “struggled” 
in the application of standard common law principles to modern day boiler-
plate.124  Beyond observing that the cases “are not altogether satisfying,”125 the 
authors failed to explain why the few cases they cited show that courts misun-
derstand boilerplate or why traditional common law principles for interpreting 
boilerplate are deficient in the modern-day setting.  
Contrary to the authors’ observations, courts are competent in their un-
derstanding of the technological changes in contracting.  The judicial consen-
sus is that these developments have not rendered traditional interpretive prin-
ciples obsolete.126  Thus, courts have made statements such as, “While new 
commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new situations, it has not 
fundamentally changed the principles of contract.”127  As shown below, two 
  
 120. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1139. 
 121. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1141 n.15, 1176, 1198, 1208.  “Shrinkwrap” is 
a type of license printed on the outside of a package wrapper, especially a software 
package, to advise the buyer that by opening the package, the buyer becomes legally 
bound to abide by the terms of the license. Shrinkwrap Agreement, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  “Clickwrap” is an electronic version of a shrinkwrap 
license in which a computer user agrees to the terms of an electronically displayed 
agreement by pointing the cursor to a particular location on the screen and then clicking. 
Point and Click Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  A “browse-
wrap” agreement does not require the user to manifest assent to the terms and condi-
tions expressly; a party instead gives his assent simply by using the website. Nguyen v. 
Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 122. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1141–42. 
 123. Id. at 1142. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 1141 n.15. 
 126. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2003); Nguyen v. 
Barnes & Noble, Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014); Treiber & Straub, Inc. v. 
U.P.S, 474 F.3d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 127. Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 403.  
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leading decisions that the authors criticized – Specht v. Netscape Communica-
tions Corp.128 and ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg129 – illustrate this truth in 
various ways. 
A.  Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp. 
In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., the consumer was a user 
of Netscape software and contended that he was not bound by a provision re-
quiring him to arbitrate disputes with the company.130  The issue was whether 
the seller adequately disclosed the term as part of the transaction.131  Netscape 
merely posted the terms of its offer of the software – including the obligation 
to arbitrate disputes – on the website from which users downloaded the soft-
ware.132  In resolving this dispute about the licensing of consumer software and 
the enforceability of an arbitration clause, the Specht court relied heavily on 
common law principles of contract.133  
In Specht, the U.S Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit – in an opinion 
written by then Judge Sonia Sotomayor – began by stating that under the es-
tablished objective theory of contract formation, “Mutual manifestation of as-
sent, whether by written or spoken word or by conduct, is the touchstone of 
contract.”134  In keeping with these traditional principles, the court observed,   
“At bottom, the objective standard . . . considers both what the offeree said, 
wrote, or did and the transactional context in which the offeree verbalized or 
acted.”135  Yet, the Specht court properly cautioned, “The conduct of a party is 
not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage in the 
conduct and knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer from 
his conduct that he assents.”136 
The Specht court accepted the general propositions that (a) “[a] voluntary 
acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the 
obligations arising from it, so far as the facts are known, or ought to be known, 
to the person accepting,”137 and (b) “[a] party cannot avoid the terms of a con-
tract on the ground that he or she failed to read it before signing the docu-
ment.”138  However, Judge Sotomayor was quick to add:  “An exception to this 
  
 128. 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 129. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 130. 306 F.3d at 27. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 35.  
 134. Id. at 30. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 29.   
 137. Id. at 30 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1589 (2018)). 
 138. Id. at 39 (quoting Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco Contracting & 
Eng’g, 89 Cal. App. 4th 1042, 1049 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)). 
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general rule exists when the writing does not appear to be a contract and the 
terms are not called to the attention of the recipient.  In such a case, no contract 
is formed with respect to the undisclosed term.” 139 
Accordingly, Kar and Radin were off-base in contending without any 
analysis that the unanimous Specht panel “struggled” to reach its decision or 
that it “misunderstood” the particulars of modern day contracting and computer 
technology.140  The Second Circuit’s opinion in Specht displayed a complete 
command of how modern-day technology differs from “the world of paper con-
tracting.”141  The Specht court mentioned the “emergent world of online prod-
uct delivery, pop-up screens, hyperlinked pages, clickwrap licensing, scrollable 
documents, and urgent admonitions to ‘Download Now.’”142  While it endorsed 
the longstanding principle that the consumer can be bound where the merchant 
sufficiently placed the buyer on notice to inquire further about the terms, the 
Second Circuit concluded that Netscape had failed to make a sufficient disclo-
sure to the consumer of the arbitration clause at issue.143  Indeed, nowhere in 
their article did Kar and Radin cite a single case where a court misunderstood 
the computer technology at issue and how that lack of knowledge tainted the 
court’s analysis and decision.144 
The Specht case and decisions like it have relied upon long-established 
common law principles of mutual assent – including the rules on inquiry notice 
– dating back almost one hundred years.145  Notably, the high quality of 
Specht’s factual and legal analysis fully supports the idea that courts are up to 
the task of deciding controversies involving e-commerce.146  Accordingly, the 
  
 139. Id. at 30. 
 140. See also Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contract-
ing in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 478 (2002) (computer technology 
has not radically changed consumer contracting).   
 141. Specht, 306 F.3d at 32 (comparing digital and paper contracts).  For another 
insightful opinion from the Second Circuit that thoroughly and persuasively considered 
the enforceability of shrinkwrap, see Schnabel v. Trilegant Corp., 697 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
 142. Specht, 306 F.3d at 31. 
 143. Id. at 32. 
 144. The authors do not mention the increased convenience to consumers associ-
ated with modern e-commerce methods.  It seems logical that most consumers would 
much rather be able to download software or media off the internet than go to a store 
and buy a disk.  It also seems paradoxical that something that makes consumers lives 
easier requires harsher contractual interpretations against sellers.  
 145. See Specht, 306 F.3d at 28 (citing Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman 
Corp., 101 Cal. Rptr. 347, 350 (1972)). 
 146. 2 SAMUEL L. WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 
6:3 (4th ed. 2019).  The current version of the Williston treatise also gives Specht high 
praise, stating it is “[a]n exceptional case, with far-reaching implications regarding 
electronic contracting, containing an excellent discussion of the objective theory as it 
pertains to the law of offer and acceptance and to the developing law of electronic con-
tracting.” Id. 
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Specht court properly held against Netscape and in favor of the software user 
because the evidence did not demonstrate that the user who downloaded 
Netscape's software had necessarily seen the terms of the company’s offer, in-
cluding the arbitration clause.147 
B.  ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg 
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,148 the Seventh Circuit held, in a unanimous 
opinion by Judge Frank Easterbrook, that a buyer of software was bound by an 
agreement that was included within the packaging and that later appeared when 
the buyer first used the software.149  Here, the consumer purchased software in 
a box containing license terms that the software company – the offeror – dis-
played prominently on the computer screen every time the user opened the 
software program.150  The consumer failed to return the software in accordance 
with the instructions.151  The ProCD court held that because the user under the 
inquiry notice doctrine had sufficient opportunity to review the terms and to 
return the software, the consumer was contractually bound after retaining the 
product past the point allowed by the vendor.152 
The ProCD court recognized the major challenge in these cases is that the 
consumer's assent is largely passive with no requirement for the buyer to make 
an overt response in rejecting the offer.153  Thus, the question of the buyer's 
acceptance of the license terms frequently turns on whether a reasonably pru-
dent consumer – offeree – would be on inquiry notice of the term at issue.154  
Under the common law, a party may exhibit assent through words or silence, 
action or inaction, but with one important qualification: “[t]he conduct of a 
party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage 
in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer 
  
 147. Specht, 306 F.3d at 32.  The authors’ remark that Specht’s analysis “struggled” 
and is not “altogether satisfying” is unjustified. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1141 
n.15.  Oddly enough, given that the Second Circuit sided with the consumer in ruling 
the arbitration clause was in effect a ride along clause, the reader would have expected 
Kar and Radin to make this influential case the showcase precedent in support of shared 
meaning analysis. See Specht, 306 F.3d 20–21. 
 148. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. at 1450.  
 151. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644–45 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev’d, 
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 152. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.  The agreement included the following language: 
“By using the discs and the listings licensed to you, you agree to be bound by the terms 
of this License. If you do not agree to the terms of this License, promptly return all 
copies of the software, listings that may have been exported, the discs and the User 
Guide to the place where you obtained it.” Id.  
 153. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451. 
 154. Id.  
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from his conduct that he assents.”155  In other words, to constitute inquiry no-
tice, to manifest his agreement, the purchaser must have actual notice of cir-
cumstances that would be adequate to place upon a prudent person the obliga-
tion to make further inquiry into the matter.  If the purchaser lacked such means 
of knowledge, the purchaser has not adequately manifested agreement to the 
packaged terms. 
The ProCD result comports with the general common law rule that an 
offeree cannot actually assent to an offer unless the offeree first has notice of 
its existence and terms.156  Therefore, assent will occur based on the “[s]tandard 
contract doctrine that when a benefit is offered subject to stated conditions, and 
the offeree makes a decision to take the benefit with knowledge of the terms of 
the offer, the taking constitutes an acceptance of the terms, which accordingly 
become binding on the offeree.”157  It bears repeating: each case is fact specific 
regarding the offeree's notice of the terms in question. 
Because the product in question – computer software – is a “good” under 
the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”),158 the ProCD court turned to the 
UCC for guidance in resolving the issue of consumer assent.159  The court first 
held that UCC § 2–207 – Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation – 
was inapplicable because the UCC § 2-207 “battle-of-the-forms” provision was 
irrelevant in cases involving only one form.160  The ProCD Court then evalu-
ated the agreement under UCC § 2–204.  Here, the court reasoned that based 
on the latter Code section (which accepts the common law rule), “[a] vendor, 
as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose 
limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance.  A buyer may 
accept by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance.”161  
Accordingly, the ProCD court found UCC § 2-204 dispositive.162 
In a subsequent decision, Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,163 the Seventh Cir-
cuit relied heavily on ProCD in explaining the fit between the contract ana-
lyzed in that decision, common law principles, and the need for a smoothly 
running economy: 
  
 155. Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2012).  Thus, “a per-
son who accepts the benefit of services rendered may be held to have impliedly made 
a promise through conduct to pay for them . . . [if] the offeree . . . knew or had reason 
to know that the party performing expected compensation.” Id. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 128.  
 158. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450 (“[s]oftware licenses . . . [are] governed by the com-
mon law of contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code”). 
 159. Id.  
 160. ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 655. 
 161. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.  Under the traditional rules of contract formation, 
ProCD created the power of acceptance and could dictate the mode of assent. Id. 
 162. Id.  
 163. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir 1997). 
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Payment preceding the revelation of full terms is common for air trans-
portation, insurance, and many other endeavors. Practical considera-
tions support allowing vendors to enclose the full legal terms with their 
products. Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to cus-
tomers before ringing up sales. If the staff at the other end of the phone 
for direct-sales operations such as Gateway's had to read the four-page 
statement of terms before taking the buyer's credit card number, the 
droning voice would anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential 
buyers . . . Customers as a group are better off when vendors skip costly 
and ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation and use instead a sim-
ple approve-or-return device. Competent adults are bound by such doc-
uments, read or unread. 164 
Although many commentators and some courts have criticized the ProCD 
decision,165 ProCD represents the majority view in the United States.166  The 
main disagreement is whether the consumer’s merely accepting delivery of the 
product and failing to return the items as required by the agreement reasonably 
manifests consent to the additional terms in the “shrink wrapped” box.167    
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has explained that ProCD’s perspective 
is well reasoned and “[m]ore consistent with contemporary consumer transac-
tions.”168  Specifically, the Rhode Island court pointed out that it is “[s]imply 
unreasonable to expect a seller to apprise a consumer of every term and condi-
tion at the moment he or she makes a purchase.”169  To the same effect, Pro-
fessor Randy Barnett has succinctly argued in defense of ProCD that the deci-
sion comports with settled law regarding the process of acceptance.170  As Bar-
nette concluded, “This insight is neither revolutionary nor reactionary.”171  
  
 164. Id. at 1149.  
 165. Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 839 (2007) (“As 
many scholars have noted, the ProCD court's analysis of the U.C.C. leaves much to be 
desired.”). 
 166. DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1069–71 (R.I. 2009). 
 167. Id.  Professor Randy Barnett has argued in defense of ProCD that the decision 
comports with settled law regarding the process of acceptance. Barnett, supra note 3, 
at 644.  First, he mentions that under UCC § 2-204, a party can manifest acceptance “in 
any manner sufficient to show agreement, including the conduct of the parties. Id. at 
643–44.  Second, he follows the principle that offer and acceptance can occur in stages, 
provided the circumstances or prior practice makes this point clear or adequate notice 
is provided. Id. at 644. 
 168. Defontes, 984 A.2d at 1071. 
 169. Id. at 1071. 
 170. Barnett, supra note 3, at 644. 
 171. Id.  
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss3/7
2019] BOILERPLATE INVALIDATION 739 
C.  Boilerplate and Computer Technology 
In today’s world of tech-savvy consumers, the authors’ contention is un-
supported that fact finders and reviewing courts make poor decisions on the 
factual and legal issues because they do not understand changes in computer 
technology and on-line contracting.172    
Undoubtedly, the general topic of cognitive heuristics biases (the con-
struct from psychology that people irrationally underestimate the possibility of 
adverse consequences, such as illnesses, accidents, and errors), sometimes lead 
people to make faulty choices.173  Nonetheless, consumers as a class are not so 
benighted as to qualify for the outdated paternalistic viewpoint that they are 
incapable of making their own fully rational and informed choices regarding 
electronic commerce.174  If the buyer is a “competent adult,” courts should not 
become a member of the buyer’s team at the “negotiation table.”175    
A commentator noted the economic downside of failing to enforce other-
wise legitimate adhesive terms: 
[A] refusal to enforce adhesive terms is just as bad as imposing price 
controls on products. Both actions substitute the top-down, paternalistic 
judgment of lawmakers for the bottom-up, nuanced judgment of the 
marketplace – preventing consumers from acting on their own individ-
ualized preferences and myopically privileging contract content over 
contracting process.176 
If judges and juries can understand complex factual issues in patent, anti-
trust, and tax litigation, they can comprehend the much simpler workings of 
browsewrap, clickwrap, and shrinkwrap in retail online computer contract-
ing.177 
  
 172. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1139 (noting impact of “momentous changes 
in communications technology”). 
 173. Id. at 1196. 
 174. See generally Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885, 
888 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Courts have been reluctant to assume consumers are too ignorant 
and benighted to fend for themselves merely because they are poor.”). 
 175. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir 1997); Rothe v. 
Revco D.S., Inc., 148 F.3d 672, 675–76 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Bank of Maryville v. 
Topping, 393 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Tenn. 1965) (improper for courts to draft contracts for 
parties). 
 176. Gibson, supra note 113, at 254. 
 177. The authors claim that ours “is a computer-based information society,” but this 
statement is exaggerated. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1139.  The secondary litera-
ture’s near-obsession with online contracting over-emphasizes the importance of Inter-
net commerce.  While this form of contracting certainly is substantial, a study in 2016 
revealed that e-commerce accounted for only 15.6% of consumer transactions. See 
Amy Gesenhues, Report: E-Commerce Accounted for 11.7% of Total Retail Sales in 
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V.  ACTUAL AGREEMENT, SHARED MEANING ANALYSIS, AND 
CONTRACT INTERPRETATION  
Kar and Radin said that “an actual agreement with common meaning is 
central to the normative justification of contract.”178  The authors’ bold position 
was that, notwithstanding physical presence in the document – or on a com-
puter screen – boilerplate without actual agreement lacks contractual status.179  
The authors said this widespread use of pseudo-contracts and their “fake 
terms,” i.e., not actual terms, invited “burgeoning forms of [consumer] decep-
tion.”180  Kar and Radin were especially critical of the “assimilationist” courts 
and commentators whom the authors said embrace fictionalized purchaser as-
sent as the basis for mutual obligation.181    
The gist of the authors’ proposal was that by referring to “shared mean-
ing,” a concept that “builds” on linguistics, Kar and Radin advocated that 
courts enforce “[t]he meaning that parties produce and agree to during contract 
formation that is most consistent with the presupposition that both were using 
language cooperatively to form a contract.”182  Culling concepts from linguis-
tics, this process requires an understanding of two key Gricean concepts – 
speaker meaning and sentence meaning.  “Speaker meaning” is what a speaker 
intends when he or she utters a sentence.183  “Sentence meaning” is what a  
sentence means independent of its occasion of use.184  Kar and Radin argued 
this distinction is critical for a proper identification of the scope and content 
of t h e  parties’ actual agreement and shared meaning of the contract.185  Stated 
  
2016, up 15.6% over 2015, MARKETING LAND (Feb. 20, 2017), https://marketing-
land.com/report-e-commerce-accounted-11-7-total-retail-sales-2016-15-6-2015-
207088 [perma.cc/YDXV-34LF]. 
 178. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1139. 
 179. Id.  Shared meaning analysis does not stand for the idea that boilerplate is part 
of the contract but is unenforceable for supervening reasons. Id. at 1142–43.  Instead, 
the authors argue that the offending terms were never part of the contract in the first 
place because they are not within the bounds of the parties’ actual agreement. Id. at 
1210–12.   Accordingly, the authors’ legal theory for addressing unenforceable boiler-
plate is not reformation, where a party seeks a contract adjustment to ameliorate a mis-
take or fraud and neither is it severance, where a party seeks to remove illegal terms, 
such as those that offend public policy. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 440–41 
(2011) (explaining reformation); 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:70 (4th ed. 2019) (explaining severance). 
 180. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1140. 
 181. Id. at 1143, 1161, 1173 (criticizing Hill v. Gateway, 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 
(7th Cir. 1997)).   
 182. Id. at 1143, 1146, 1160, 1167, 1216 (adding qualification that the presupposi-
tion holds “even if one party was not acting fully cooperatively so long as the 
presupposition was warranted”).     
 183. Id. at 1145–46.  
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 1165. 
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differently, “speaker meaning” is what a speaker intends to convey to another 
person within an interpersonal conversation, which often depends upon 
both parties relying on implicit presuppositions of linguistic cooperation to 
form a contract.  Simply put, for Kar and Radin, a contract formed through 
actual agreement exists when the individual speaker meanings unite to form a 
shared meaning.186  The authors’ argument lacks legal force as described be-
low.   
A.  The Goals and Components of Shared Meaning Analysis 
In their focus on doctrine, Kar and Radin contended that an incremental 
but relentless “paradigm slip” in the principles of contractual obligation has 
gone from (a) seller and buyer mutual consent to (b) assent by the buyer as the 
party to be charged to (c) the buyer’s fictional/constructive/hypothetical assent, 
and then to (d) the purchaser’s mere fictional or constructive notice of the 
terms.187  Kar and Radin argued that consumer contracting has become an in-
tolerable system of “pseudo-contract” where sellers impose private obligations 
upon consumers without a supporting “actual agreement.”188  
The authors said pseudo-contract distorts core contract law concepts, such 
as “assent,” “agreement,” and “contract.”189  While the authors acknowledged 
  
 186. Id. at 1139.  “By using language to make offers and acceptances, the two 
[parties] have formed a contract, which includes a shared meaning to which both 
parties have actually agreed.” Id. 
 187. Id. at 1139–40.  Regarding the dilution of assent, the authors cite no cases 
establishing that the law has proceeded in the linear manner as described above.   
 188. Id. at 1160–1161.  Throughout their article, the authors compare modern day 
boilerplate contracts with an 1883 logging contract agreement based on a Minnesota 
Supreme Court decision, Thompson v. Libby. 26 N.W 1 (Minn. 1885); see e.g., Kar & 
Radin, supra note 4, at 1139, 1180.  The facts in the authors’ example were that a 
builder and a logger agreed that if the logger “[w]ould give me all your logs marked 
H.C.A, cut from the last two winters, [t]he builder would] pay [him] ten dollars per 
thousand feet, boomscale at Minneapolis, Minnesota.” Id. at 1139.  The authors’ reli-
ance on this logging contract is unpersuasive because the logging contract reflects a 
similar, if not a greater, incidence of gaps and omissions: 
[A] superficial comparison between the two templates of a deal is incorrect. 
In fact, both deals are similarly complex, and in both deals people harbor 
just as much “sheer ignorance.” In general, the complexity of the contract, 
and the resulting level of ignorance, has nothing to do with the boilerplate 
scheme. The ordinary contracts from the romantic era of pre-boilerplate . . 
. are surprisingly complex and sometimes leave more uncertainty than the 
thick boilerplate of the mass-contract era. 
Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. REV. 
883, 887 (2014). 
 189. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1140.  The idea that standard form contracts 
differ from the common understanding of a “contract” is not new. See John J. A. Burke, 
Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 308 
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that “Boilerplate is not in and of itself pseudo-contract,”190 they still main-
tained that “[a] great deal of contemporary boilerplate text has become 
pseudo-contractual.”191  As prime examples of this type of boilerplate, the au-
thors slammed clickwrap contracts – such as Apple’s iTunes licensing service 
–  and contracts specifying mandatory arbitration – such as contracts subject to 
the Federal Arbitration Act.192  By comparison, Kar and Radin insisted that the 
essence of contract is where the parties cooperatively communicate their shared 
meaning, excluding the unread – and frequently unreadable – boilerplate.193  
Accordingly, the authors contended that boilerplate text that was never coop-
eratively communicated between the parties cannot contribute to a shared 
meaning of the parties.  Kar and Radin said the same is true for boilerplate 
where it is merely “informational (fact-stating)” and creates no contractual 
commitments.194  
The authors’ position that boilerplate must be more than just physically 
included in the text but must be co-operatively communicated to form an en-
forceable agreement lacks support.195  Where parties bind themselves to a con-
tract that appears regular on its face and contains boilerplate, a prima facie case 
exists that the parties have an actual agreement on all terms, even in the sense 
used by Kar and Radin.196  By their signatures – or other conduct manifesting 
assent – both parties have united in producing and approving a single document 
  
(2000) (stating “[A] standard form contract is not a contract as that word is normally 
understood”); Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 144–47, 
155 (1970) (because no real bargaining occurs over standard form contract terms, these 
instruments are best understood as “things” – that is, as part of the product being sold). 
 190. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1155.  
 191. Id. at 1155, 1182 (high end boilerplate contracts between sophisticated parties 
are frequently contractual). 
 192. Id. at 1203–04, 1208. 
 193. Id. at 1139–40, 1155–56. 
 194. Id. at 1163.  The authors are unduly broad in their definition of mere informa-
tional terms.  They quote ten examples of boilerplate sentences from iTunes' online 
“terms and conditions,” which they say merely convey information, i.e., they are just 
fact-stating. Id. at 1162, 1219 n. 82.  But consider the following hypothetical:  One 
provision from the iTunes listing states, “If you turn off automatic renewal, [then] 
you will continue to have access to the Apple Service for the remainder of your 
Apple Music Subscription term.” Id. at 1219 n. 82.  Contrary to the authors’ assertion, 
if Apple stopped access after the customer turned off the automatic renewal before term 
cessation, the quoted language does implicitly create a substantive contractual right in 
the customer and a substantive contractual obligation in the service provider regarding 
the service. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Winters, 354 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Tenn. 2011) (“In addi-
tion to the explicit terms, contracts may be accompanied by implied duties, which can 
result in a breach.”). 
 195. Id. at 1163–64.  
 196. See PLAINTIFF'S PROOF PRIMA FACIE CASE § 2:9 (West 2019). 
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containing the entire scope of their agreement, including the contract’s boiler-
plate.197  Moreover, where parties include an integration clause stating that a 
contract contains all the terms of the agreement, the parties thereby concur that 
every word matters regarding the parties’ full and final intent on the scope of 
the agreement.198  The frequent use of integration clauses in American com-
merce easily defeats Kar and Radin’s thesis that where the contract contains 
superfluous boilerplate, those terms generally are not part of the actual agree-
ment.199   
Because many, if not most, boilerplate contracts lack a separate clause 
stating that boiler plate is enforceable, the authors’ have signaled their desire 
to eliminate most forms of boilerplate as part of the American contracting sys-
tem.200  From a practical stand point, the authors left unexplained how their 
actual agreement/shared meaning analysis proposal for revising (they would 
say clarifying) contractual assent could be implemented in the face of likely 
staunch resistance from industry groups and their allies in federal and state leg-
islatures.201  Also missing is the authors’ thoughts on the framework for a via-
ble replacement system for the derided “assimilationist” system that could 
timely assure sellers and buyers that they will have enforceable and complete 
agreements in a manner agreeable to both sides. 
B.  Cooperation and Good Faith during Contract Formation 
The authors argued that one normative objective of shared meaning anal-
ysis is that the parties are (or should be) in a “cooperative” relationship before 
they enter a contract.202  The authors stated, “Contract meaning depends on an 
implicit presupposition of cooperative language use to form a contract”203  
  
 197. Id.  
 198. See Bandera Drilling Co. v. Sledge Drilling Corp., 293 S.W.3d 867, 871–72 
(Tex. App. 2009) (adopting this view of integration clauses). 
 199. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1155 (indicating boilerplate can become part of 
the actual agreement when cooperatively communicated between the parties). 
 200. Id.  
 201. Id. at 1135.  Another (unmentioned) limiting principle for “actual agree-
ment/shared meaning” analysis is that it cannot contravene statute.  Thus, the authors’ 
proposal is problematic because it would entail impermissible changes to Article Two 
of the UCC, the sales article, which currently has no requirement for an actual agree-
ment or a process congruent with shared meaning analysis.  The UCC version does not 
include the idea of an “actual agreement” as used by the authors. UCC 1-201(b)(3) 
defines “agreement,” as distinguished from “contract,” to mean the “bargain of the par-
ties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including 
course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade as provided in UCC 1-303.” 
U.C.C. § 1-201 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1977).    
 202. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1216.    
 203. Id. at 1144.  The authors go on to say, “Contract meaning has always properly 
depended on shared meaning in this sense . . .” Id. at 1146. 
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They also commented, “Breach of the cooperative norms relating to truth can 
be understood as a form of bad faith during the process of negotiation.”204  
As authority for this proposition, the authors cited section 205, cmt. c. of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.205  This provision addresses the implied 
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing generally and includes one def-
inition of “good faith” as “honesty in fact as related to the transaction” specif-
ically.206  
The authors misconstrued section 205 as being relevant in any sense to a 
breach of a cooperative norm of good faith arising during contract negotia-
tions.207  Section 205, comment c, explicitly says, “This Section, like Uniform 
Commercial Code § 1-203, does not deal with good faith in the formation of a 
contract.”208  Many cases are to the same effect and say Section 205 and UCC 
§ 1-203 presuppose an existing valid contract.209  Although section 205 is rel-
evant to contract modifications, Kar and Radin only invited confusion by im-
plying this Restatement section applies across the board to contract for-
mation.210  Consequently, the authors’ reliance on Section 205 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts was misplaced.  
Apart from their questionable use of the Restatement, the authors misde-
scribed the extent of the cooperative “norms” and the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing that exists during the negotiation stage.211  Contrary to the impres-
sion left by the authors, the pre-award version of good faith and fair dealing is 
much narrower than the contractual version.  In Market Street Associates Ltd. 
Partnership v. Frey,212 the Seventh Circuit did not recognize a general duty for 
a  cooperative relationship during contract formation akin to the broad duty 
advocated by Kar and Radin.213  The court said: 
Before the contract is signed, the parties confront each other with a nat-
ural wariness. Neither expects the other to be particularly forthcoming, 
and therefore there is no deception when one is not.  Afterwards the 
  
 204. Id. at 1152. 
 205. Id. 
 206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981). 
 207. Id. at cmt. c.  
 208. Id. (emphasis added).  
 209. Courts agree, “because the existence of th[e] covenant [of good faith and fair 
dealing] depends on the existence of an underlying contractual relationship, there is no 
claim for a breach of this covenant where a valid contract has not yet been formed.” 
Scott Timber Co. v. United States, 692 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Mountain Highlands, LLC v. Hendricks, 616 F.3d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir. 2010)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
 210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. e (1981). 
 211. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1154. 
 212. 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 213. Id.  
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situation is different.  The parties are now in a cooperative relationship 
the costs of which will be considerably reduced by a measure of trust.214 
The Seventh Circuit in Market Street made plain that before the contract 
is formed the parties deal at arms’ length and the trust factor is naturally low.215  
Contrary to the authors’ conclusion, a general cooperative relationship arises 
only after contract execution and not beforehand.216  The Seventh Circuit then 
explained how parties may take legitimate advantage of their counterpart dur-
ing contract formation: 
In fact, the law contemplates that people frequently will take advantage 
of the ignorance of those with whom they contract, without thereby in-
curring liability. The duty of honesty, of good faith even expansively 
conceived, is not a duty of candor. You can make a binding contract to 
purchase something you know your seller undervalues. That of course 
is a question about formation, not performance, and the particular duty 
of good faith under examination here relates to the latter rather than to 
the former. 
. . . . 
The formation or negotiation stage is precontractual, and here the duty 
is minimized . . . . 217  
The authors cited none of these cases mentioned in this section setting a 
relatively low bar for the degree of cooperation required before contract exe-
cution.  Instead, Kar and Radin emphasized that parties “with equal capacities 
to enter into all and only trades they actually agree will offer expected gains 
for each . . . .”218  By emphasizing a co-operative process aimed at achieving 
party equality, Kar and Radin would erase the advantages that merchants legit-
imately can have over consumers in terms of hard but fair bargaining in a free 
market economy.219  The real world is not – and never will be – populated by 
parties with “ equal capacities” reaching “actual agreements” to enter just 
t h e  trades t h a t  will offer expected gains for each party.220  Cases are even 
  
 214. Id. (emphasis added). 
 215. Id. at 595. 
 216. Id. at 594.  
 217. Id. at 593–94 (emphasis added).   
 218. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1161. 
 219. “Hard bargaining . . . [is] acceptable, even desirable in our economic system.” 
Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1159 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984). 
 220. Cf. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1161; but see Kessler, supra note 3, at 640 
(“Society, when granting freedom of contract, does not guarantee that all members of 
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rare that a party with a legitimate advantage would readily give it up.  Courts 
should leave parties where they find them in terms of their talents, abilities, and 
resources; judges should not become players in renovating the existing Amer-
ican economy to pass into law a party’s social or economic theories. 
Quite likely, merchants would object to the Kar and Radin view of coop-
eration that sellers should do business only with parties with “equal capacities” 
and where the parties agree the trade will offer “expected gains for each 
party.”221  Additionally, companies include boilerplate clauses for a definable 
business reason.  If a court or legislature outlawed boilerplate – which is per-
missible222 – firms likely would either leave that market or charge higher prices 
to account for the greater risk flowing from the loss of these boilerplate clauses.  
As one commentator observed, 
In short, if a term is efficient, it should be enforced whether it emerges 
by sheer luck from a dysfunctional market for lemons or by design from 
a functioning market with robust competition and universal salience of 
product features.  The alternative is to allow consumers to have their 
cake and eat it too-i.e., to enjoy the lower price but then escape enforce-
ment of the term. Faced with that possibility, sellers would change the 
boilerplate to allocate such risks to themselves, inefficiently, and charge 
higher prices to make up for it.  Such an outcome would do no favors 
for seller or consumer.223 
C.  The Restatement (Second) and ‘Common Meaning’ of the Parties  
Relying upon the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 201(1), 
comment c,224 Kar and Radin posited that the traditional and “primary search” 
  
the community will be able to make use of it to the same extent.”).  For additional 
discussion of freedom of contract, see Part VII. 
 221. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1161. 
 222. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Doubtless a 
state could forbid the use of standard contracts . . . .”). 
 223. See James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV. 161, 214 
(2013); see also Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to 
Standard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. 
REV. 227, 236 (2007) (“Businesses use these forms to insert clauses which reduce or 
eliminate a myriad of risks.  By reducing risks, businesses using standard forms are 
able to reduce prices charged for goods and services.  The prevalent use of standard 
form contracts is indicative of their near-indispensability to commerce.”). 
 224. Section 201(1) states, “Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a 
promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that mean-
ing.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981). Cmt. c provides: 
Subsection (1) makes it clear that the primary search is for a common mean-
ing of the parties, not a meaning imposed on them by the law. To the extent 
that a mutual understanding is displaced by government regulation, the re-
sulting obligation does not rest on “interpretation” in the sense used here. 
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in contract interpretation is to identify the “common” (or “shared”) meaning of 
the parties.225   As discussed below, the authors’ argument was not persuasive. 
Despite the Restatement’s comment about the search for the common 
meaning of the parties, Kar and Radin supported their case with a section of 
the Restatement that is misleading at best.226  The current Williston treatise 
cogently summarized the status of the Restatement’s “common meaning” prin-
ciple of Section 201(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: 
[I]t will indeed be a rare instance when it is appropriate to apply the 
subjective, mutual standard, for it involves the situation in which both 
or all the parties to the contract attach the same meaning to words, yet 
nevertheless some dispute has reached the courts. It is therefore not too 
surprising that most of the cases invoking the mutual standard of the 
Restatement Second [Section 201] do so either by way of dictum, with 
the court actually applying some other, typically objective, standard; or 
do so without much in the way of analysis, the appellate court merely 
indicating its affirmance of the trial court; or finally, do so in the infre-
quent situation in which its use is most appropriate: When the parties to 
the contract agree as to the meaning of the term or agreement, but one 
of the parties due to a change of circumstances or a third party . . . is 
arguing for a more favorable meaning . . . . 
Aside from these few situations, the courts have not discussed or ap-
plied the subjective, mutual standard. Thus, the mutual standard advo-
cated by the Restatement Second remains a minority rule . . . .227 
Read in its entirety, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 
201(1) is not – as Kar and Radin contended – the overarching principle or the 
“central focus” of contractual obligation and assent.228  The most that can be 
  
The objective of interpretation in the general law of contracts is to carry out 
the understanding of the parties rather than to impose obligations on them 
contrary to their understanding: “the courts do not make a contract for the 
parties.”  
Id. at cmt. c. 
 225. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1146 n.24.  Kar and Radin rely repeatedly 
on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and cite no supporting cases. 
 226. One commentator has noted the tendency of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts in some instances to draw erroneous conclusions about the state of the law. See 
W. Noel Keyes, The Restatement (Second): Its Misleading Quality and a Proposal for 
Its Amelioration, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 23, 24 (1985). 
 227. 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 
31:14 (4th ed. 2007). 
 228. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1138. 
37
Feldman: Actual Agreement, Shared Meaning Analysis, and the Invalidation o
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
748 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol.  84 
said about the “minority standard” of Section 201(1) is that it addresses an “in-
frequent” issue and is not the bedrock concept as advertised by Kar and Ra-
din.229 
D.  The Courts and “Common Meaning” of the Parties 
According to the authors, “common meaning of the parties” is the mean-
ing the parties subjectively assign to the contract terms.230  Repeatedly, the au-
thors highlighted the essence of contract as reflecting the parallel mental oper-
ations and understandings of the parties.231  The authors were incorrect in 
stressing a subjective theory of assent. 
The experience of one jurisdiction’s use of the phrase “common meaning 
of the parties” proves the point.  In a 2007 Delaware Court of Chancery deci-
sion, the court said, “The primary search is for the common meaning of the 
parties, not a meaning imposed on them by law.”232  This passage does not 
support the authors’ thesis because the court of chancery simply meant that 
courts distinguish between meaning supplied by the parties or by the law.233  
The real issue becomes how does a state such as Delaware – a jurisdiction 
where many large corporations are headquartered and whose state law controls 
the interpretation of numerous contracts – understand “common meaning of 
the parties?” 
[Section 1.01] The Delaware Supreme Court has answered this ques-
tion.   In a 2014 decision, the high court concisely summarized the prin-
ciples linking contract and common meaning . . . . 
[Section 1.02] Contract terms themselves will be controlling when 
they establish the parties' common meaning so that a reasonable person 
in the position of either party would have no expectations inconsistent 
with the contract language. Under standard rules of contract interpre-
tation, a court must determine the intent of the parties from the lan-
guage of the contract.234 
  
 229. Cf. Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 540, 552 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1999) (“Almost never are all the connotations of a bargain exactly identical for both 
parties”). 
 230. See Section IV.E (collecting references showing the authors’ reliance on the 
subjective standard of assent). 
 231. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1163. 
 232. Seidensticker v. Gasparilla Inn, Inc.  No. CIV.A. 255-CC, 2007 WL 4054473 
at *3 n.13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 2007) (quoting Klair v. Reese, 531 A.2d 219, 223 (Del. 
1987)) (emphasis added). 
 233. Id.  
 234. Salamone v. Gorman, 106 A.3d 354, 368 (Del. 2014) (emphasis added); see 
also In re Silverstein, 37 A.3d 382, 385 (N.H. 2012) (the parties’ intent “is determined 
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Therefore, Kar and Radin were only half-right when they contended that 
courts seek a common meaning.  Judges do not seek common meaning of the 
parties in a subjective sense but instead seek the common meaning of the words 
used by the parties in an objective sense unless the agreement provides to the 
contrary.  Significantly, the authors cited no decisions indicating their construct 
has been the dominant view for “centuries.”235  By following the minority view 
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 201, Kar and Radin revealed 
their preference for the subjective standard over the objective standard in de-
termining mutual assent.236  The next section will contrast and compare the two 
standards and will demonstrate the superiority of the objective test for assessing 
the obligations of the parties. 
E.  The Competing Standards of Contractual Assent: The Subjective 
and Objective Theories 
As stated above, the authors contended that shared meaning analysis en-
dorses neither the objective nor the subjective theory of contractual obligation 
and assent.237  This assertion cannot be accepted.  When it comes to contractual 
boilerplate, Kar and Radin’s article repudiated foundational principles of con-
tract interpretation and disregarded the objective theory as it seeks to revive the 
defunct subjective theory of assent as the general basis for contractual obliga-
tion.238  
Their article contains numerous legal conclusions based on the consum-
er's “actual agreement,” or “knowing assent.”239  The quoted terms relate to the 
  
from the agreement taken as a whole, and by construing its terms according to the com-
mon meaning of their words and phrases.”) (emphasis added); Grosse Pointe Park v. 
Mich. Mun. Liab. and Prop. Pool, 702 N.W.2d 106, 124 (Mich. 2005) (“The law pre-
sumes that the contracting parties' intent is embodied in the actual words used in the 
contract itself. A rule to the contrary would reward imprecision in the drafting of con-
tracts.”); 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 
30:1 (4th ed. 2019) (contract interpretation “is the ascertainment of [a contract's] mean-
ing by determining the meaning of the words employed.”). 
 235. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1140, 1154. 
 236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981). 
 237. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1143 n.18, 1160. 
 238. Id.  
 239. Kar and Radin mention “actual agreement” 78 times and the equivalent con-
cept “knowing assent” three times. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4.  “Knowing consent” 
requires subjective agreement with the course of action. Knowing Consent, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  A commentator notes that imposing a knowing con-
sent standard could “require proof not only that the consumer knew there was a [par-
ticular] clause in the contract, but that the consumer read and understood the clause.” 
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual 
Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 175 (2004).  Accept-
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offeror's personal state of mind and his subjective understandings.240  In es-
sence, Kar and Radin said that shared meaning exists where parties have par-
allel speaker meaning.241  Unfortunately, Kar and Radin devoted just a few 
sentences to explaining the objective and subjective theories of mutual assent, 
even though the choice of doctrine would decide the viability of boilerplate as 
a feature of the contracting system.242  Thus, my discussion will comprehen-
sively compare the two schools of thought.  
Kar and Radin’s proposal asserted that there must be an “actual” agree-
ment, and it is apparent that this adjective qualifies the concept of an “agree-
ment.”  The authors did not specifically discuss the meaning of “actual,” but 
the dictionary definition is clear enough.243  I agree with Randy Barnett who 
stated that “actual” consent means “subjective” consent.244   
Regarding the determination of contractual assent, the true test is not what 
the parties to the contract intended it to mean from a subjective viewpoint but 
what intent the parties manifested from an objectively verifiable perspective.245  
The objective test theory of assent comes in two variations, literalism – the 
majority view – and contextualism. 
First, under literalism, “[a] cardinal rule of contractual interpretation is to 
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties.  [Courts] determine the 
parties' intent by examining the plain and ordinary meaning of the written 
words from the contract document.  If the language is clear and unambiguous, 
the literal meaning of the contract language controls.” 246 
Second, under contextualism, parties' intentions are to be determined 
from the four corners of the contract when the contract is clear and unambigu-
ous.247  However, even when the agreement is unambiguous, the court may 
“consider the situation of the parties and the accompanying circumstances at 
  
ing this knowing consent standard also would undermine the duty to read and under-
stand the contract where a consumer argues he did not read or understand the boiler-
plate. See infra Section VIII. 
 240. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1154. 
 241. Id.  
 242. Id.  
 243. Actual, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/actual (last 
visited June 30, 2019) [perma.cc/XW6J-77RJ] (“actual” means “existing in fact” or 
“real”). 
 244. Barnett, supra note 3, at 629.  
 245. Id. at 635.  
 246. Allmand v. Pavletic, 292 S.W.3d 618, 630 (Tenn. 2009) (citations omitted); 
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Constr. Mgmt. Eng’rs of Fla., Inc., 377 S.E.2d 119, 121 
(S.C. Ct. App. 1989). 
 247. Hamblen Cty. v. Morristown, 656 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tenn. 1983). 
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the time it was entered into, not for the purpose of modifying or enlarging or 
curtailing its terms, but to aid in determining the contract's meaning.”248 
In various decisions, courts have considered the standards under the ru-
bric of “objective” standard of interpretation.249  Courts also have applied the 
objective theory to standard form contracts.250   
1.  The Objective Theory Further Explained 
Under the objective theory, “a contracting party is generally bound by the 
apparent intention he outwardly manifests to the other contracting party.”251  
Courts have said, “The only intent of the parties to a contract which is essential 
is an intent to say the words and do the acts which constitute their manifestation 
of assent.”252  To the extent that a party’s real but secret intention differs from 
the contract terms, it is “entirely immaterial.”253    
The most common way parties express this intent is to sign the contract, 
but a court might deem a party equally bound by his other words and actions 
  
 248. Id. at 334 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 235 (1932)); Bokor 
v. Holder, 722 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).  This definition of contextual-
ism defeats any argument that courts are unconcerned with speaker meaning. 
 249. See City Investing Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 624 A.2d 1191, 1198 (Del.1993); 
Myers v. Myers, 408 A.2d 279, 281 (Del.1979) (where a contract is clear on its face, 
the Court should rely solely on the clear, literal meaning of the words as they would be 
understood by an objective reasonable third party); Brown Bros. Elec. Contractors, Inc. 
v. Beam Constr. Corp., 361 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (N.Y. 1997) (courts rely on the “objective 
manifestations” of the parties as expressed by the contract terms and “attendant” cir-
cumstances). 
 250. E.g., Amco Ins. Co. v. Haht, 490 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Iowa 1992) (applying the 
objective standard to an insurance policy, which is a contract of adhesion); Amera-Seiki 
Corp. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 721 F.3d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 251. Janssen Biotech, Inc. v. Celltrion Healthcare Co., 296 F. Supp. 3d 336, 342 
(D. Mass. 2017). 
 252. Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 190 (D.C. App. 2009). 
 253. In re McLean Indus., Inc., 90 B.R. 614, 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting 
Cohn v. Fisher, 287 A.2d 222, 224 (N.J. Super. Div. 1972)).  In Skycom Corp. v. Telstar 
Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained the policy against 
the recognition of secret intent: 
The objective approach is an essential ingredient to allowing the parties 
jointly to control the effect of their document. If unilateral or secret intents 
could bind, parties would become wary, and the written word would lose 
some of its power. The ability to fix the consequences with certainty is es-
pecially important in commercial transactions that are planned with care in 
advance. 
813 F.2d 810, 815 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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signifying agreement.254  Thus, the law does not demand that the parties had 
“[h]armonious intentions or states of mind.”255  Citing a famous law review 
article by Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Florida Supreme Court concisely sum-
marized the applicable law: “The making of a contract depends not on the 
agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of 
external signs – not the parties having meant the same thing but on their having 
said the same thing.”256  
As indicated by the above observation from the Florida Supreme Court, 
evidentiary concerns explain the pre-eminence of the objective standard.257  In 
a frequently cited opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit com-
mented in Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc.,258  
It would be helpful if judges were psychics who could delve into the 
parties' minds to ascertain their original intent. However, courts neither 
claim nor possess psychic power.  Therefore, in order to interpret con-
tracts with some consistency, and in order to provide contracting parties 
with a legal framework which provides a measure of predictability, the 
courts must eschew the ideal of ascertaining the parties' subjective in-
tent and instead bind parties by the objective manifestations of their in-
tent.259 
2.  When Consumers Click “I Agree” – An Ambiguous Action? 
In a key unexamined issue, Kar and Radin did not address whether a mer-
chant would be justified in concluding that the buyer who clicks the “I agree” 
button in an online computer contractual transaction is necessarily manifesting 
binding assent.  Where the merchant sufficiently discloses the terms of an offer 
to the offeree, the consumer's clicking “I agree” is the consumer's unambigu-
ous, voluntary, and affirmative act of assent that equates to a signature.  It 
should not be required for the consumer here to make an online statement to 
the effect that “I consent – and I really mean it.”  
As one commentator observed: 
  
 254. See Newkirk v. Vill. of Steger 536 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2008); D’Antuono 
v. Serv. Rd. Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 308, 323 (D. Conn. 2011) (signature usually con-
clusive evidence of consent); Wash. Greensview Apartment Assoc. v. Travelers Prop. 
Cas. Co., 295 P.3d 284, 292 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). 
 255. Devlin v. Ingrum, 928 F.2d 1084, 1095 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Lilley v. Gon-
zales, 417 So. 2d 161, 163 (Ala. 1982)). 
 256. Gendzier v. Bielecki, 97 So. 2d 604, 608 (Fla. 1957) (citing Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464 (1897)).   
 257. Id. at 608.  
 258. 619 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 259. Id. at 1009. 
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Many courts . . . have found the act of clicking an “I agree” button 
to be an express manifestation of assent to contract terms. Some 
opinions have said so explicitly, while others seem to assume with-
out discussion that when an offeree is required to click the “I agree” 
button, she knows that she is entering into a contract.260  
For instance, when the consumer tenders this “explicit acceptance” of a 
software license agreement, numerous courts properly indicate that this con-
duct raises no contestable issues of fact upon a motion for summary judg-
ment.261  An exception would be where a consumer – the offeree – clicks the 
“I agree” button would not manifest assent to contractual terms in the relatively 
infrequent circumstance where the seller's offer fails to inform the consumer 
that this action would signify assent to the terms or where the consumer’s re-
sponse both affirms and contradicts the manifestation of assent.   
In contrast with Kar and Radin, Randy Barnett has offered a powerful 
legal argument on why the consumer's clicking “I agree” satisfies the mani-
fested assent element under the objective theory and the plain meaning rule: 
When one clicks “I agree” to the terms on the box, does one usually 
know what one is doing?  Absolutely.  There is no doubt whatsoever 
that one is objectively manifesting one's assent to the terms in the box, 
whether or not one has read them.  The same observation applies to 
signatures on form contracts.  Clicking the button that says, “I agree,” 
no less than signing one's name on the dotted line, indicates unambigu-
ously: I agree to be legally bound by the terms in this agreement. 
If consent to be legally bound is the basis of contractual enforcement, 
rather than the making of a promise, then consent to be legally bound seems to 
exist objectively.  Even under the modern objective theory, there is no reason 
for the other party to believe that such subjective consent is lacking.  Even if 
one does not want to be bound, one knows that the other party will take this 
conduct as indicating consent to be bound thereby.262  
3.  The Policy of the Objective Theory  
Kar and Radin did not discuss in any depth the policy for the objective 
theory.  Understanding its rationale clarifies why this doctrine has succeeded 
as the prevailing mode for ascertaining the existence of mutual assent even for 
standardized or boilerplate agreements.   
  
 260.  Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 1307, 1323–24 (2005). 
 261. See i.Lan Sys. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. 
Mass. 2002); see also Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
 262. Barnett, supra note 3, at 635. 
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The objective test protects the “fundamental principle” of the security of 
contracting actions as it maintains a “[w]orkable system of commerce and eco-
nomic exchange.”263  The goal of the objective test is that by requiring evidence 
beyond litigation-motivated, post hoc descriptions of the parties' earlier states 
of mind, the judicial system increases the reliability of its decision-making pro-
cess.264  A related policy is that the objective test allows the first party to have 
little or no reason to fear that the second party may thereafter void the contract 
by his claiming either a failure to read or a subjective misunderstanding of the 
agreement.265 
As Grant Gilmore opined,   
[I]f “the actual state of the party’s minds” is relevant, then each 
litigated case must become an extended factual inquiry into what 
was “intended,” “meant,” “believed” and so on.  If, however, we 
can restrict ourselves to the “externals” . . . then the factual inquiry 
will be much simplified and in time can be dispensed with alto-
gether as the courts accumulate precedent about recurring types of 
permissible and impermissible “conduct.”266  
Because it emphasizes external, ascertainable events regarding the deal, 
the objective test upholds the value of unbiased adjudication and readily cap-
tures the parties’ manifested intent before a dispute arises between the par-
ties.267 
The root cause of the authors’ detour from prevailing law was that Kar 
and Radin overlooked the nature of contract as expounded by Learned Hand in 
a 1911 case still cited regularly in the 21st century: 
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or 
individual, intent of the parties.  A contract is an obligation attached by 
the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which 
ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent.  If, however, if it 
were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the 
  
 263. Wayne Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 
1129 (2008).  
 264. Solan, supra note 70, at 380. 
 265. Allied Office Supplies Inc. v. Lewandowski, 261 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (D. 
Conn. 2003); see also SR Int’l. Bus. Ins. Co., v. World Trade Center Props., LLC, 467 
F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2006); Dugan v. Brunswick Sewerage Co., 142 F.3d 398 (7th Cir. 
1998) (subjective evidence made through the testimony by a party on the meaning of a 
contract is invariably self-serving and inherently difficult to verify); Apeldyn Corp. v. 
Eidos, LLC, 943 F. Supp. 2d. 1145, 1149 (D. Or. 2013) (statements of a party’s subjec-
tive intent that were not expressed or communicated when the contract was formed are 
not permissible evidence of intent). 
 266. GRANT GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT 47 (2d ed. 1995). 
 267. Id.  
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words, intended something else than the usual meaning which the law 
imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some mu-
tual mistake, or something else of the sort.  Of course, if it appears by 
other words, or acts, of the parties, that they attribute a peculiar meaning 
to such words as they use in the contract, that meaning will prevail, but 
only by virtue of the other words, and not because of their unexpressed 
intent. 
. . . . 
Yet the question always remains for the court to interpret the reasonable 
meaning to the acts of the parties, by word or deed, and no characteri-
zation of its effect by either party thereafter, however truthful, is mate-
rial.  The rights and obligations depend upon the law alone.268 
As Professor Lawrence A. Solan commented, Judge Hand rejected the 
inherently unreliable party testimony about an intent that the party never man-
ifested in contemporaneous – and verifiable – fashion to the opposing party 
during contract formation.269  Indeed, under the strict or literal version of the 
objective theory, the courts examining mutual assent are generally limited in 
their evidentiary scope of review to the four corners of an unambiguous docu-
ment.270  These decisions further exemplify the strong connection between the 
objective theory, the plain meaning rule, and the nature of contract (per Judge 
Hand). 
Finally, the objective theory of contracts comports with the need and rea-
son for voluntary assent.271  The rule preserves individual autonomy because 
the coercive power of the state allows the parties to exercise their personal 
freedom with the result that “[c]onsent is the human vehicle for exercising free-
dom or autonomy.”272  Also, the objective doctrine enhances the freedom of 
contract because the law allows parties the increased ability to manage their 
business relationships “[b]y limiting operative manifestations to those that are 
  
 268. Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (em-
phasis added); Chesapeake Energy Corp. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., N.A., 773 
F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2014); Galvin v. EMC Mortg. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 3d 224, 230 
(D.N.H. 2014); see also Grosse Pointe Park v. Mich. Mun. Liab. and Prop. Pool, 702 
N.W.2d 106, 123 (Mich. 2005) (“[I]t is during litigation that a party’s motivations are 
the most suspect and the party’s incentives the greatest to attempt to achieve that which 
the party could not during the give-and-take of the contract negotiation process.”). 
 269. Solan, supra note 70, at 379–80. 
 270. “[T]he objective theory of contracts . . . limits the court to the four corners of 
[a clear and definite] contract in determining the intention of the parties.” In re Feder-
ated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 240 B.R. 711, 722 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1999) (quoting Cloverland 
Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Fry, 587 A.2d 527, 529–30 (Md. 1991)) (calling this position “the 
majority view”). 
 271. Barnes, supra note 263, at 1154. 
 272. Id. at 1129. 
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received and known by the parties to the negotiation.”273  Lastly, it protects the 
parties’ reliance and expectation interests.274  Regrettably, Kar and Radin men-
tioned none of these salutary principles in their article. 
F.  The Subjective Theory Compared 
The main reason for the demise of the subjective theory was that courts 
“[r]efuse to inquire into the subjective mental processes of each of the parties 
to a contract, except in the most compelling circumstances.”275  As Judge Frank 
Easterbrook said in a colorful way, “Yet [contract] ‘intent’ does not invite a 
tour through [a party's] cranium, with [that party] as the guide.”276  Another risk 
is that reliance on the subjective test could create what one commentator called 
a “de facto option” in the promisor.  As Randy Barnett stated: “Such a strategy 
might create a de facto option in the promisor.   The promisor could insist on 
enforcement if the contract continued to be in her interest, but if it were no 
longer advantageous, she could avoid the contract by producing evidence of a 
differing subjective intent.”277  Because the subjective approach relies on evi-
dence directly inaccessible to the other party, much less to third parties, broad 
judicial consideration of subjective intent would undermine the security of 
transactions by greatly reducing the reliability of contractual commitments.”278  
For many decades, “[t]he controversy has been resolved.  Contract law aban-
doned the theory of subjective intention as unworkable.”279  
In arguing that the boilerplate in most standard form contracts does not 
lead to actual assent, Kar and Radin’s argument led inexorably to the conclu-
sion that they endorsed the subjective view of contractual assent with respect 
to boilerplate.  In a commentary directly on point for this issue, Randy Barnett 
stated,  
  
 273. Id. at 1131. 
 274. Id. at 1157. 
 275. While the subjective theory as a general doctrine of assent no longer prevails, 
vestiges have survived.  One qualification is “The subjective meaning attached by either 
party to a form of words is not controlling on the scope of the agreement between the 
parties unless one party knows or has reason to know of a particular meaning attached 
by the party manifesting assent.” Brokers Title Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
610 F.2d 1174, 1181 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 276. Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 1987).  The court 
further observed: “Secret hopes and wishes count for nothing. The status of a document 
as a contract depends on what the parties express to each other and to the world, not on 
what they keep to themselves.” Id. at 814–15. 
 277. Randy Barnett, Contract is not Promise; Contract is Consent, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW, 45–46 (Gregory Klass et al., eds 
2014). 
 278. Id. 
 279. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 30, at 61–64 (4th ed. 
2001).   
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[I]f a subjective view of contractual assent is taken, then form contracts 
pose a very serious problem.  If a person must consciously have had the 
particular terms in mind when signifying agreement to them, then most 
terms in most form contracts lack assent.  Most people fail to read most 
terms most of the time and no person can credibly claim to read all of 
the terms in form contracts all of the time . . . Hence the problem: How 
can someone be said to have “actually”– meaning subjectively – con-
sented to terms of which one was completely unaware?  To impute sub-
jective assent to the person indicating consent to a form is obviously to 
engage in a fiction.  Under a subjective theory of contractual assent, 
very few, if any, of the terms in a form contract would be assented to.280 
Barnett repeatedly notes that “actual” consent specifically means “subjec-
tive” assent to boilerplate.281  Because a pillar of shared meaning analysis is an 
“actual agreement,” which was the linchpin of their thesis, Kar and Radin fully 
embraced the “unworkable” subjective theory as the foundation for their pro-
posal.  
G.  How Much Sharing is Needed for Shared Meaning? 
The next flaw in the authors’ “shared meaning” doctrine conflicts with 
the principle that “[c]ourts must give effect to the manifest intent of the parties 
as it existed at the time of contract formation.”282  Unfortunately, no objective 
way exists for the parties to know ex ante what terms a court ex post would rule 
constitutes the actual agreement versus the “ride along” text.  Under the au-
thors’ shared meaning analysis, as critiqued above, Kar and Radin run headlong 
against the reality that “[o]nly rarely can one party show that the meaning that 
it asserts at the time of the dispute was shared by both parties at the time the 
contract was made.” 283  The parties will know for sure which clauses are either 
part of the actual agreement or ride along terms only by the settlement or after 
the conclusion of litigation, which is costly and time-consuming.  Accordingly, 
under a shared meaning analysis regime, boilerplate contracts from the moment 
of formation would exist under a cloud of uncertainty over which terms are 
judicially enforceable, which would further impair the predictability and relia-
bility of contractual relationships.  Kar and Radin did not examine this flaw in 
their theory. 
  
 280. Barnett, supra note 3, at 626–29.  
 281. Id.  
 282. Associated Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Ruff, 424 P.3d 571, 586 (Mont. 2018); Thor 
Seafood Corp. v. Supply Mgmt. Servs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 283. 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.9 (3d ed. 2004); 
see also Baladevon, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1994). 
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Nevertheless, the authors indicated that sufficient common meaning ei-
ther exists between the parties or can usually be unearthed upon diligent re-
view.284  Contrary to the impression left by Kar and Radin about a discoverable 
common meaning, it bears repeating that “[i]n practice, only rarely can one 
party show that the meaning that it asserts at the time of the dispute was shared 
by both parties at the time the contract was made.”285  In fact, the chances of 
parties sharing the same interpretation of a particular issue are very low be-
cause contracts are structurally incapable of addressing the myriad circum-
stances that can arise.  Professors Coyle and Wedemaier commented: 
Everyone knows that contracts are incomplete, in that they do not de-
scribe and discount “all relevant future contingencies . . . with respect 
to both likelihood and futurity.”  One reason for incompleteness is that 
parties do not have complete presentation.  Even if this were not so – 
that is, even if parties could assign a probability and value to all possible 
future states of the world – it would be prohibitively costly to negotiate 
and draft a contract covering such an infinitude of possibilities.286 
The above conclusion raises another issue under shared meaning analysis; 
namely, once a court deletes the non-binding boilerplate, are the admissible 
portions of the contract sufficient to constitute a binding contract?  According 
to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(2), the general rule is that a contract 
is sufficiently definite and certain to be enforceable where, based upon the 
agreement's terms, the rules of construction, and principles of equity, a court 
can ascertain what the parties have agreed to do.287  Whether these terms are 
sufficiently definite is a different inquiry than what terms the parties considered 
material and essential to that agreement.  In considering enforceability, the 
court may opine that striking these terms could leave the parties with an inad-
equate shell of a contract if the application of shared meaning analysis eradi-
cates essential terms.288 
The authors’ suggestion that courts may routinely excise ride-along terms 
as being non-consensual runs counter to fundamental polices that courts do not 
ignore or delete contract terms except for strong reasons.  Thus, the settled rule 
is courts prefer an interpretation that gives reasonable meaning to all provisions 
to one that leaves a portion of the agreement useless, meaningless, without 
  
 284. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1165. 
 285. See supra note 283 and accompanying text. 
 286. John F. Coyle & W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Interpreting Contracts Without 
Context, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1673, 1677 (2018). 
 287. Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell, 187 A.3d 1209, 1232 (Del. 2018). 
 288. See Best Brands Beverage, Inc. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 842 F.2d 578, 587–
88 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating, “if the terms of the agreement are so vague and indefinite 
that there is no basis or standard for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or 
broken . . . then there is no enforceable contract”). 
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force and effect, or inexplicable.289  No term – including boilerplate terms – 
should be rejected as surplusage if the court in examining the whole instrument 
can discover a reasonable purpose for the words.290  These last mentioned prin-
ciples alone would be a strong reason for a court to reject shared meaning anal-
ysis and its treatment of boilerplate.  In a ruling especially damaging to Kar 
and Radin’s thesis, the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts observed, “All parts of a contract are to be given effect, whether ‘boil-
erplate’ or not.”291 
Further, courts are to “assume that the parties intended that a binding con-
tract be formed,” and “[t]hus, any choice of alternative interpretations, with one 
interpretation saving the contract and the other voiding it, should be resolved 
in favor of the interpretation that saves the contract.”292  Considering that Kar 
and Radin’s apparent objective was to void most or all boilerplate contracts, 
with the inevitable impact of leaving the U.S economy in distress, courts should 
strive to enforce these contracts to the greatest extent possible. 
H.  The Ramifications of Shared Meaning Analysis 
Because 99% of all contracts are consumer/vendor boilerplate transac-
tions, 293 if Kar and Radin’s approach to reforming boilerplate was first imple-
mented on a limited basis and studied, a likely ramification would be a sky-
rocketing in transaction costs of contracting – and of the prices of most goods 
  
 289. Hunt Constr. Group, Inc. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 456, 459 (Fed. Cl. 2001), 
aff’d, 281 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bombay Realty Corp. v. Magna Carta, Inc., 790 
N.E.2d 1163, 1165 (N.Y. 2003); cf. Robinson v. Tate, 236 S.W.2d 445, 450 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1950) (courts should make a reasonable construction of a contract and should not 
“deliberately emasculate” the agreement).    
 290. 17A AM. JUR. 2d CONTRACTS § 387 (1991); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
STWB Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 74, 92 (S.D. N.Y. 2002) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 203(a) (1981)). 
 291. Girardi Distributors, Inc. v. Truck Drivers Union, Local 170 Intern. Broth. of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am., 1989 WL 200979 (D. 
Mass. June 15, 1989) (also stating “Many contracts are pre-printed standard forms, i.e., 
all boilerplate.  Try telling your mortgagee that its note and mortgage are unenforceable 
because they are ‘boilerplate’”); Pietroske, Inc. v. Globalcom, Inc., 685 N.W.2d 884, 
888 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]he fact that the service agreement is a boilerplate con-
tract does not prevent a true meeting of the minds.”).  For other cases stating without 
qualification that boilerplate terms can be binding, see, e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
N.A. v. Winget, 602 Fed. Appx. 246 (6th Cir. 2015); Albany Ins. Co. v. MV SEALAND 
URUGUAY, No. 00CIV.3497 2002 WL 1870289 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2002); Car-
olina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 940 F. Supp. 3d 569, 577 (N.D. Ohio 2013).   
 292. Stevens Aviation, Inc. v. DynCorp Int’l LLC, 756 S.E.2d 148, 153 (S.C. 2014). 
 293. Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A Critique of The Reasonable Expectations Doc-
trine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (1989) (citing W. David Slawson, Standard Form 
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 
(1971)). 
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and services.  The length of contracts would necessarily double or triple, and 
the time needed to enter contracts could be indeterminable until such time that 
merchants and consumers could validate an “actual agreement.” 
Such a pilot study also would likely provide important evidence that, 
given the breadth and depth of the effects of shared meaning analysis, the 
chances are very high that the authors’ proposal would fall victim, in whole or 
in part, to unforeseen effects pursuant to the law of unintended consequences: 
The law of unintended consequences is a frequently-observed phenom-
enon in which any action has results that are not part of the actor's pur-
pose.  The superfluous consequences may or may not be foreseeable or 
even immediately observable and they may be beneficial, harmful or 
neutral in their impact.  In the best-case scenario, an action produces 
both the desired results and unplanned benefits; in the worst-case sce-
nario, however, the desired results fail to materialize and there are neg-
ative consequences that make the original problem worse.294 
Such adverse outcomes are increasingly likely to occur when a decep-
tively simple solution – such as shared meaning analysis – seeks to regulate the 
highly complex world of commercial purchasing.295  Nevertheless, without any 
evidence, the authors confidently proclaimed, “Not enforcing these pseudo-
contract provisions will not only help return contract regimes to the core 
of private ordering but it will also help produce more efficient mar-
kets.”296  How Kar and Radin reached this conclusion is unclear, but as 
pointed out elsewhere in this Article, Kar and Radin subscribe to the ro-
mantic myth that contracts with minimal content necessarily lead to supe-
rior results.297  This reasoning is errant because “ordinary contracts from the 
romantic era of pre-boilerplate . . . are surprisingly complex and sometimes 
leave more uncertainty than the thick boilerplate of the mass-contract era.”298 
The final problem is that, from a practical standpoint, courts are naturally 
going to resist adopting a theory that 99% of all consumer contracts in the 
  
 294. Margaret Rouse, Law of Unintended Consequences, WHATIS.COM (Feb. 
2016), https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/law-of-unintended-consequences 
[perma.cc/AX3Y-W7WC]. 
 295. See In re Schwartz, 461 B.R. 93, 98 n.4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011) (noting similar 
observation about the typical impact of the law of unintended consequences). 
 296. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1179–80, n.127.  The authors also observe,  
“Shared meaning analysis offers courts a general and flexible way to avoid legal errors 
that can result from failures to recognize and eliminate hidden conflicts.” Id. at 1192.  
Kar and Radin set up a false dilemma when discussing the resolution of conflicts be-
tween the actual agreement and the ride-along text.  Put another way, there can never 
be a conflict between the actual agreement and ride along terms when the latter have 
no salience of any kind to the agreement.   
 297. Id. at 1180 (giving an example of a “short and clear” timber sales contract in 
rural Minnesota from 1885).   
 298. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
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United States might not be enforceable in whole or in part because of the lack 
of shared meaning.299  The common law generally prefers incremental changes 
to doctrine as compared to demolishing one legal regime and replacing it with 
another.  Based on the many concerns discussed above, the wholesale applica-
tion of shared meaning analysis would disturb the rights and responsibilities 
the parties allocated at contract formation and increase the unpredictability and 
uncertainty of contractual relations – which would contradict two of contract 
law’s most important normative goals.300 
VI.  SHARED MEANING ANALYSIS AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 
Kar and Radin argued that the current system deprives consumers of their 
freedom of contract.301  They also contended that shared meaning analysis does 
not interfere with the established principles of freedom of contract but facili-
tates economic liberty because the parties are able to execute the actual agree-
ment.302  Before delving into the authors’ argument, this Section will summa-
rize the established elements of freedom of contract. 
A.  General Principles of Freedom of Contract 
“Freedom of contract” is a fundamental aspect of American commerce.  
The doctrine represents a party's “power to decide whether to contract and to 
establish the [contract] terms.”303  Many courts have commented: 
[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it 
is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the ut-
most liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when entered into 
freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred, and shall be enforced by 
courts of justice.  Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to 
  
 299. See Eric A. Zacks, The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211: Unfulfilled 
Expectations and the Future of Modern Standardized Consumer Contracts, 7 WM. & 
MARY BUS. L. REV. 733, 733 (2016) (“judges historically have been reluctant to disturb 
standardized consumer contracts, regardless of the applicable doctrine”). 
 300. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Contracting with Electronic Agents, 50 EMORY L.J. 
1047, 1073 (2001) (noting these two normative bases of contract). 
 301. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1214 (“Because of these conceptual distortions 
[in current law], many legal actors, as well as the public, have begun to lose track of 
what contract and freedom of contract even are.”). 
 302. Id. at 1138. (“Without the presence of an actual agreement freely reached, 
the state is not easily justified in enforcing a contract, because instead of enhancing 
the parties’ freedom of contract, the legal system would be limiting it.”). 
 303. Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for Indi-
vidual Parties: The Tug of War Continues, 77 UMKC L. REV. 647, 654 (2009). 
51
Feldman: Actual Agreement, Shared Meaning Analysis, and the Invalidation o
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
762 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol.  84 
consider,[] that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of con-
tract.304  
Freedom of contract balances party autonomy and party accountability.  
First, with the autonomy component, parties have the right to bind themselves 
legally; it is a judicial concept that contracts are based on mutual agreement 
and free choice.305  Importantly, parties may exercise their liberty to contract 
even if the agreement “may not seem desirable or pleasant to outside observers 
[such as law professors].”306  Second, under the accountability component, par-
ties must accept the consequences of their voluntary choices.  The general rule 
of freedom of contract includes the need for a party to accept a possible bad 
bargain without court interference or paternalism.307  
To accomplish this goal, freedom of contract confines courts to their ju-
dicial function and dictates that they should not rewrite contracts to make them 
more equitable308 or reallocate the rights and obligations the parties have ac-
cepted under their agreement.309  This judicial self-restraint is so strong and the 
public interest in contract enforcement is so important310 that “[t]he fairness or 
unfairness, folly or wisdom, or inequality of contracts are questions exclusively 
within the rights of the parties to adjust at the time the contract is made.”311  
Freedom of contract also has a societal impact as it promotes “[t]he nec-
essary certainty, stability and integrity of contractual rights and obligations.”312  
On the one hand, the public interest demands that “individuals have broad pow-
ers to order their own affairs by making legally enforceable promises.”313  Lib-
erty of contract allows both buyers and sellers to benefit from a productive 
commercial environment.314  To the same end, the law encourages parties to 
  
 304. See e.g., Balt. & Ohio Southwestern Ry. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505–06 
(1900); see also, First Ala. Bank of Montgomery v. First State Ins. Co., 899 F.2d 1045, 
1085–86 (11th Cir. 1990); Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 382 (Tenn. 2011). 
 305. Autonomy, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 306. Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 100 (Tenn. 1999). 
 307. Id.  
 308. See Morta v. Korea Ins., 840 F.2d 1452, 1460 (9th Cir. 1988); Westmoreland 
v. High Point Healthcare Inc., 721 S.E.2d 712, 722–23 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012); see also 
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACTS AS PROMISE 113 (1981) (“If we take autonomy seriously 
as a principle for ordering human affairs . . . people must abide by the consequences of 
their choices . . . .”). 
 309. See Marriott Corp. v. Dasta Constr. Co., 26 F.3d 1057, 1068 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 310. El Paso Field Servs., L.P. v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 389 S.W.3d 802, 811–12 
(Tex. 2012). 
 311. Barnes v. Helfenbein, 548 P.2d 1014, 1021 (Okla. 1976). 
 312. McCall v. Carlson, 172 P.2d 171, 187–88 (Nev. 1946). 
 313. Kona Vill. Realty, Inc. v. Sunstone Realty Partners, XIV, 236 P.3d 456, 458 
(Haw. 2010) (quoting City Express, Inc. v. Express Partners, 959 P.2d 836, 840 n.4 
(Haw. 1998)). 
 314. Id.  
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maximize their personal objectives – “striving for that advantage is the source 
of much economic progress.”315  On the other hand, “the freedom to contract 
is not unlimited and . . . contracts that are contrary to public policy will not be 
enforced.”316 
 The upshot is that “hard bargaining is not only acceptable, but indeed, 
desirable, in our economic system, and should not be discouraged by the 
courts.”317  The ordinary consumer has no special immunity from the conse-
quences of his or her choices.318  Accordingly, a fundamental principle of con-
tract law is “[w]ise or not, a deal is a deal.”319 
B.  Freedom of Contract and Boilerplate  
With respect to boilerplate, the Michigan Supreme Court, in a wide-rang-
ing analysis of the issues, has been emphatic that freedom of contract is fully 
available with adhesion contracts.320  In considering an insurance policy – a 
ubiquitous adhesion contract321 – the Michigan high court observed: “When a 
court abrogates unambiguous contractual provisions based on its own inde-
  
 315. Indust. Representatives, Inc. v. CP Clare Corp., 74 F.3d 128, 131–32 (7th 
Cir.1996); see also Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal for the Contract Duress Doc-
trine, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 443, 466 (2005) (“A long held assumption about market 
behavior is that optimal results on the whole obtain when each individual actor in the 
market chooses the best option for that individual.”). 
 316. Lewis v. Giordano's Enterprises, Inc., 921 N.E.2d 740, 753 (Ill. Ct. App. 
2009); see also DeVetter v. Principal Mut. Life Ins., 516 N.W.2d 792, 794 (Iowa 1994) 
(“For a court to strike down a contract on [public policy] grounds, it must conclude that 
the preservation of the general public welfare imperatively . . . demands invalidation so 
as to outweigh the weighty societal interest in the freedom of contract.”).   
 317. 28 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 
71:7 (4th ed. 2003); see also Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 863 N.E.2d 503, 512 (Mass. 
2007) (“Absent any legally cognizable restraint,” both parties remain “free to drive 
whatever bargain the market [will] bear.”). 
 318. Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885, 888 (N.D. Ill. 
2000) (“Courts have been reluctant to assume consumers are too ignorant and benighted 
to fend for themselves merely because they are poor.”). 
 319. United Food & Com. Workers Union v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 806 F.2d 1385, 
1386 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 320. Rory v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 35 (Mich. 2005); see also Morris R. 
Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 563, 588 (1932) (extensive statement 
of the “all important” role standardization plays in safeguarding freedom of contract). 
 321. See e.g., Max True Plastering Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 
864 (Okla. 1996) (“Insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion because of the uneven 
bargaining positions of the parties.”). 
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pendent assessment of ‘reasonableness,’ the court undermines the parties' free-
dom of contract.”322  Thus, Michigan and other jurisdictions see no contradic-
tion between adhesion contracts and the freedom of contract.323  Similarly, 
courts should construe standard form contracts and individually negotiated 
contracts under the same general principles.324 
Kar and Radin did not address these perspectives.  Even where the con-
tracting parties have manifested their assent to standardized adhesion clauses, 
Kar and Radin created what amounts to a public policy defense against the 
enforcement of boilerplate in the guise that these terms are outside the parties’ 
actual agreement.325  Even assuming that consumers in this situation are mak-
ing a poor choice, a Florida District Court of Appeals decision explained: “Peo-
ple should be entitled to contract on their own terms without the indulgence of 
paternalism by courts [or commentators] in the alleviation of one side or an-
other from the effects of a bad bargain.” 326  Put another way, the consumer has 
the right to make up his own mind about the risks and benefits of a contract 
notwithstanding the opinions of outside persons who believe that a non-nego-
tiable contract with captive prospective buyers is the sheerest of follies.327 
Finally, in keeping with their consistent tilt in favor of consumers, Kar 
and Radin offered little, if any, discussion of the merchant’s right of freedom 
of contract in boilerplate.  For the authors, the merchant’s freedom of contract 
in this area need go only so far as complying with what the buyer determines 
to be the boundaries of the actual agreement.328  This theme is apparent from 
  
 322. See Rory, 703 N.W.2d at 33. 
 323. See also Bailey v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 255 P.3d 1039, 1047 (Colo. 2011) 
(“The freedom to contract is especially important in the insurance industry, as insurance 
policy terms are the primary means by which parties distribute and shift risk.”); Fore-
cast Homes, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 213 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
2010). 
 324. See Rory, 703 N.W.2d at 31, 35, 42 (standard form contracts are contracts sub-
ject to traditional principles of contract interpretation). 
 325. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1202. 
 326. Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda, 464 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1985); see also Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885, 888 
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Courts have been reluctant to assume consumers are too ignorant and 
benighted to fend for themselves merely because they are poor.”); Johnson v. Fireman's 
Fund Ins. Co., 272 N.W.2d 870, 875–76 (Iowa 1978) (Reynoldson, C.J., concurring) 
(“A jurist's personal disdain for any particular clause is wholly irrelevant if the con-
tracting parties have agreed to include it in their contract.”). 
 327. See Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 100 (Tenn. 1999) (“Generally, the 
parties to a contract are free to agree upon . . . terms that may not seem desirable or 
pleasant to outside observers”). 
 328. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1179 (“[parties] cannot create a common 
meaning of the parties without actually creating that common meaning.”). 
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Kar and Radin’s claim that shared meaning analysis purportedly does not “reg-
ulate parties’ actual agreements for fairness or on any other ground.”329  How-
ever, the above statement lacks support because the authors’ primary reason 
for shared meaning analysis is, in fact, to regulate the market by preventing 
what they considered to be exploitation of consumers.330  While there will al-
ways be the potential for merchant abuses of consumers, just as there will al-
ways be the potential for consumer abuses of corporations,331 the authors got 
too close to – and perhaps went over – the line of denying businesses their valid 
rights in boilerplate merely because such recognition could impair consumer 
bargaining power. 
Without empirical support, the authors subscribed to a normative ideal 
that markets function better when consumers and merchants bargain as free and 
equal parties, thereby leading to a favorable bargain for each side.332  Kar and 
Radin further believed that it is feasible and desirable to level out merchant 
advantages through shared meaning analysis.333  Thus, the authors would sig-
nificantly restrain the merchant’s freedom of contract with no guidance over 
what constitutes the seller’s “most essential” terms.  Implicitly, these terms  are 
“few” in number, and their purpose is to avoid “battles” between the parties, 
all subject to the consumer’s satisfaction.334  Given the subjective nature of 
shared meaning analysis, established above, this proposal further shows Kar 
and Radin’s slanted definition of freedom of contract.       
VII.  A PARTY’S DUTY TO READ AND UNDERSTAND CONTRACTS 
Boilerplate contracts are known for the reality that consumers generally 
do not read these agreements in any depth before signing them.335  Where a 
consumer signs such a form contract without reading or understanding it, some 
  
 329. Id.  
 330. Id.  Kar and Radin argue that assimilationist approaches improperly invite 
new and expanding forms of market deception. According to the authors: “[M]arket 
forces have begun to interact with assimilationist legal doctrine to create powerful in-
centives for businesses systematically to mislead consumers through what is sometimes 
called careful contract design.” Id. at 1196. 
 331. See Katie Reilly, Shoplifting and Other Fraud Cost Retailers Nearly $50 Bil-
lion Last Year, MONEY.COM (June 22, 2017), http://time.com/money/4829684/shoplift-
ing-fraud-retail-survey/ [perma.cc/95RD-3VF6] (loss of inventory from shoplifting 
alone cost the U.S. retail industry approximately $18 billion in 2016).   
 332. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1161 (stating the premises of the American mar-
ket economy as focusing on “parties with equal capacities to define and enter into only 
those terms that both agree offer expected gains for each”). 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. at 1179. 
 335. David v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 992 (Colo. 1986) (“It is common 
knowledge that the detailed provisions of standardized contracts are seldom read by 
consumers.”). 
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contemporary courts continue to cite nineteenth century precedents that “[i]t 
will not do for a man to enter a contract, and, when called upon to respond 
to its obligations, to say he did not read it when he signed it, or did not 
know what it contained.”336  This principle subsequently became known as the 
“duty to read” doctrine337 – better stated as the duty to read and understand the 
contract because merely reading the contract is no defense to liability.338  Ab-
sent an invalidating cause for modifying or overturning an agreement a party 
has a broad duty “to read its contract and to learn its contents before signing 
it.”339  This “duty to read” is a “basic tenet of contract law”340 and is closely 
aligned with the plain meaning rule.341  The main consequence will be that 
absent the other side's fraud, misrepresentation, or similar misbehavior, a party 
to a contract is legally bound by its terms whether or not she has actually read 
or understood them.342 
  
 336. Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875). For a sampling of decisions 
relying on Upton, see K–Con Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 131 Fed. Cl. 275, 318 
(Fed. Cl. 2017); Bell v. Land Title Guarantee Co., 422 P.3d 613, 616 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2018); ABM Farms, Inc. v. Woods, 692 N.E.2d 574, 579 (Ohio 1998); cf. Clayton 
P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts As An Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 680 
(explaining why consumers can be “perfectly rational” not to read or understand 
the terms, “[e]specially given the  inability to negotiate around terms, if the buyer 
accurately predicts that the costs of review exceeds its benefits”); Melvin Aron Ei-
senberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 243 
(1995). 
 337. John D. Calamari, Duty to Read – A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 
341, 341 n.4 (1974) (a party generally owes this so-called duty to himself as opposed 
to a third party); see also Charles L. Knapp, Is There a “Duty to Read”?, 66 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1083, 1085–86 (2015) (“A person signing an agreement has a duty to read it and, 
absent a showing of fraud, if the person is capable of reading and understanding the 
contract then he is charged with the knowledge of what the contract says . . . He cannot 
avoid the consequences of what he signed by simply saying that he did not know what 
he signed.”). 
 338. See, e.g., Dasz, Inc. v. Meritocracy Ventures, Ltd., 969 N.Y.S.2d 653, 655 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (stating a “duty to read and understand” the agreement). 
 339. Burwell v. S.C. Nat'l Bank, 340 S.E.2d 786, 789 (S.C. 1986); see also Roberts 
v. Roberts, 618 S.E.2d 761, 764 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 340. Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 218 P.3d 486, 495 (Mont. 2009) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 341. See Kaiser Aluminum Corp., Inc., No. 02-10429, 2004 WL 97658, at *3 
(Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 16, 2004). 
 342. The authors rely upon Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 211(3), 
which closely resembles shared meaning analysis. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1202.  
The Restatement provides that regarding unread or misunderstood boilerplate, “Where 
the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not 
do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the 
agreement.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
Most commentators have concluded that Section 211 has been a failure because it con-
tradicts the objective theory of mutual assent. See, e.g., Zacks, supra note 299, at 747–
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Other rationales for the duty are: the ignorant party is estopped from rais-
ing the defense of the lack of consent to unread terms;343 the party is bound by 
a conclusive presumption of knowledge of the terms;344 the uninformed signa-
tory is held to the terms because he was negligent or assumed the risk of unfa-
vorable terms;345 or the promisee failed unjustifiably to protect his or her own 
interests.346  In fact, a party’s testimony or other evidence to prove his prior 
uncommunicated subjective understanding of his contract is inadmissible.347 
Kar and Radin did not delve into the doctrinal basis for the duty to read 
or the sound policies it advances.  Instead, the authors argued that the increased 
complexity and length of modern contracts makes the duty to read an unfair, 
impracticable relic.348  The only circumstances that they said would justify in-
vocation of this principle is for text that has been “cooperatively communi-
cated, i.e., the parties specifically agreed to the wording”349   
Kar and Radin further criticized this line of authority by complaining that 
when a merchant delivers copious boilerplate to consumers during the for-
mation stage of contracting, “[i]t is typically the business that is behaving 
badly by violating the cooperative norms of language use – not the consumer 
who cannot but fail to read all this copious boilerplate text and live a normal 
life.”350  Respectfully, this passage is hyperbole – the authors strained credulity 
as they inferred a merchant’s lack of good faith and fair dealing based largely 
on the proposed contractual page count.  In many sectors of the economy, 
lengthy contracts are necessary given the complexity of the subject matter, an 
example would be a contract for the sale of a residence.  Moreover, given the 
  
48; Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age of the Internet of Things: Article 2 of the 
UCC and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 899–901 (2016).  Kar and Radin say that 
the commentators are only “partially right” insofar as assimilationist courts fail to em-
brace shared meaning analysis. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1202–03. 
 343. Knapp, supra note 337, at 1086. 
 344. Barnes, supra note 223, at 250–51. 
 345. Calamari, supra note 337, at 341. 
 346. Allied Office Supplies Inc. v. Lewandowski, 261 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112–13 (D. 
Conn. 2003). 
 347. Apeldyn Corp. v. Eidos, LLC, 943 F. Supp. 2d. 1145, 1149 (D. Or. 2013) 
(“Statements of a party’s subjective intent that were not expressed or communicated 
when the contract was formed are not permissible evidence of intent.”). 
 348. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1181. 
 349. Id.  
 350. Id.  By making the point that consumers lack the time to read copious boiler-
plate, the authors’ argument contains a questionable implicit premise, namely, consum-
ers would benefit if the law required merchants to give the consumer a more substantial 
opportunity to read and understand boilerplate. Id. at 1140.  This conclusion is dubious.  
Greater disclosure requirements are “useless” because they would not produce more 
consumer readership of contracts or more robust mutual assent in contract formation. 
Omri Ben Shahar, The Myth of the Opportunity to Read in Contract Law, 5 EUR. REV. 
CONT. L. 1, 6, 20 (2009) (stating “there is some evidence that the availability of terms 
in advance of the purchase does nothing to improve their content”). 
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time and expense companies devote to the preparation of standardized forms 
that must address the company’s entire customer base, it is counter-intuitive to 
contend that companies “typically” desire to harass their customers. 
The duty to read and understand a contract rests on sound legal and eco-
nomic policies.  As shown above, the authors’ rejection of the fundamental 
premise that the law holds a party responsible for reading and understanding 
its contract would impair the party’s exercise of autonomy, thereby undermin-
ing the stability and predictability of contracts.351  Absent enforcement of the 
purchaser’s duty to read and understand the agreement, merchants would lack 
confidence in the commercial system.352  The seller’s fear would be that the 
purchaser could too easily complain that he had not read or understood the fine 
print in the contract; this argument would effectively stymie commercial activ-
ity in the marketplace.353  Because a consumer would evidence such a conten-
tion largely or even solely on his subjective intent, no reliable method exists to 
sort out meritorious claims that a consumer failed to understand the terms.354  
Additional legal principles support the duty to read and understand the 
contract.  For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court in Morstad v. 
Atchison, T. & S. F. Railway Co. reasoned that, absent fraud or similar invali-
dating cause, the contract signatory “owes it to the other party to read or have 
read, the contract . . . because the other party has a right to and does conform 
his own conduct to the requirements of the contract . . . .”355  Another support-
ing principle is that the duty to read and understand the terms preserves fairness 
to merchants because the law should preclude consumers from accepting the 
benefits under the contract while selectively denying the existence of disliked 
provisions.356  
Lastly, the “[d]uty to read rule derives from the objective theory of con-
tract.”357  The consequences of the “duty to read” doctrine are consistent with 
  
 351. Kar and Radin’s attack on the cases following the duty to read and the conse-
quences to the consumer fails to account for the numerous exceptions to the doctrine in 
addition to fraud or mistake.  The leading contracts treatise mentions the various causes 
in this category, for example, the print is too fine to be legible or is so cramped to be 
unreadable. 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 
6:47 (4th ed. 2018). 
 352. See Barnes, supra note 223, at 237–38. 
 353. ABC Farms, Inc. v. Woods, 692 N.E.2d 574, 579 (Ohio 1998) (quoting Upton 
v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875)). 
 354. See supra Part III.C. 
 355. Morstad v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 170 P. 886, 889 (N.M. 1918). 
 356. See Colony Ins. Co. v. Jack A. Halprin, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-1059, 2012 WL 
2859085, at *10 (D. Conn. July 11, 2012) (stating that not enforcing the duty to read 
would make attempts to enter into contracts “futile”); Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. 565 A.2d 908, 911 (Del. 1989) (“adhesive nature of a contract does not allow 
the non-drafting party to reject contract terms that he later finds unappealing”). 
 357. Allied Office Supplies, Inc. v. Lewandowski, 261 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (D. 
Conn. 2003). 
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the autonomy strand of freedom to contract.358  Professors Robert E. Scott and 
Jody S. Kraus commented, 
The duty to read doctrine provides individuals with an incentive not to 
sign agreements unless they have read and understood them first. In this 
sense, it increases the likelihood that enforceable agreements will be 
informed and thus serve the value of autonomy. By increasing the like-
lihood that agreements are mutually informed, this rule would also in-
crease the probability that agreements enhance social welfare (i.e., the 
consumer will be better off economically.).359  
Based on Scott and Kraus's observation, the law preserves the purchaser’s 
right of autonomy while advancing society's – and the merchant’s – interest in 
the enforcement of valid contracts.360      
VIII. PRECEDENTS CHALLENGING THE USE OF BOILERPLATE 
Cases from various American jurisdictions comport with several themes 
in Kar and Radin’s article.  After summarizing the cases espousing the minority 
view, I will show why the majority view more faithfully supports the essential 
nature of contract. 
A.  Freedom of Contract 
A surprising number of decisions or judicial observations directly support 
Kar and Radin’s argument that standard form agreements can impair the con-
sumer's freedom of contract under the autonomy principle.  
A judge on the Illinois Court of Appeals once said, “Freedom of contract 
simply does not exist” where the merchant draws up the terms and the con-
sumer who “merely ‘adheres' to it has little choice as to its terms.”361  Another 
case observed that the “marketplace reality” suggests that freedom of contract 
in the sale of goods under an adhesion contract is actually “nonexistent.”362  
Other courts stated that the consumer in this circumstance has little freedom of 
  
 358. Steven W. Feldman, Mutual Assent, Normative Degradation, and Mass Mar-
ket Standard Form Contracts–A Two-Part Critique of Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Van-
ishing Rights and the Rule of Law (Part I), 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373, 408 (2014). 
 359. ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 436 (4th 
ed. 2007). 
 360. Wayne R Barnes, Consumer Assent to Standard Form Contracts and the Vot-
ing Analogy, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 839, 865 (2010). 
 361. Tibbs v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 373 N.E.2d 492, 498 (Ill. Ct. App. 1978) (Moran, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 
33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 22 (1920)). 
 362. Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 565 (Tex. 1990). 
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contract with no ability to look elsewhere for a more favorable contract.363  In 
sum, a number of courts rule that free choice is lacking where (a) the play of 
the market does not bring the parties together, (b) the parties do not meet each 
other on an approximately equal economic footing, and (c) the two sides do not 
enter their contract as the result of free bargaining.364    
Furthermore, Kar and Radin could have pointed out that the consumer's 
frequently weaker bargaining position has prompted some jurisdictions to in-
stitute a stricter level of judicial review and policing of an adhesion contract to 
help preserve freedom of contract.365  These decisions would have bolstered 
the authors’ argument that freedom of contract is largely a mirage for consum-
ers given that merchants can be tempted to go over – and sometimes will go 
over – the line of fair bargaining.  Therefore, true freedom of contract – from 
the authors’ standpoint – is lacking in such a one-sided environment. 
B.  Cases Contesting Mutual Assent 
A second line of cases uses a different mode of analysis from those deci-
sions emphasizing the objective theory of contract, the plain meaning rule, the 
duty to read, and the existence of consumer assent for adhesion contracts.  Var-
ious decisions pre-dating Kar and Radin’s article shared their concerns that ad-
hesion contracts do not fit the traditional model of offer and acceptance in a 
bargained-for exchange.   
For example, the Tennessee Court of Appeals follows a unique theory of 
assent where one party signs a standard form contract furnished by the other 
party.366  In this “circle of assent” doctrine, a party that signs such a document 
will be bound by the provisions in the form over which the parties actually 
bargained and by such other terms that are not unreasonable in view of the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction.367   
  
 363. Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1186 (Cal. 1976). 
 364. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960); Price v. 
Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502, 507 (Or. 1965) (en banc); Gautreau v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. 
Co., 410 So. 2d 815, 818–19 (La. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 429 So. 2d 
866 (La. 1983); Pickering v. Am. Emp'rs Ins. Co., 282 A.2d 584, 593 (R.I. 1971) (stat-
ing that there is a higher burden to declare forfeiture of consumer rights); Perkins v. 
Standard Oil Co., 383 P.2d 107, 112–13 (Or. 1963) (stating adhesion contracts should 
be “construed with an awareness of the inequality of the bargainers”).  For other deci-
sions disassociating freedom of contract and adhesion contracts, see Feldman, supra 
note 358, at 436 n.379. 
 365. Medovoi v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572, 584 n.2 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1979) (Thompson, J., concurring) (limiting adhesion contracts to those “nec-
essary to preserve freedom of contract in fact”). 
 366. See Bd. of Dirs. of Harriman Sch. Dist. v. Sw. Petroleum Corp., 757 S.W.2d 
669, 675 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). 
 367. Id. at 674; Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile–Cadillac–Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 
634, 637–38 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987), overruled by Copeland v. Healthsouth/Methodist 
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Striking parallels exist between the Tennessee circle of assent doctrine 
and shared meaning analysis.  Both concepts allow subjective assent, i.e., “ap-
parent and genuine assent.”368  Both standards mandate that merchants make 
extensive disclosures to consumers.369  Both standards show hostility to boil-
erplate terms.370  Both doctrines oppose what they see as the imposition of ab-
normal risks upon consumers.371  Lastly, both formulations allow judges to re-
write the contract by the deletion of boilerplate if it fails to meet the above 
requisites.372   
Other decisions reveal concerns about the use of standardized contract 
forms.  In a representative 1981 Missouri Court of Appeals case, the court ob-
served: 
Our law distinguishes . . . between a contract consented to by negotia-
tion and a contract assented to by adherence.  The one (at least, as par-
adigm) describes a bargain between equals; the other, a form with stand-
ard terms imposed upon the applicant to take or leave . . . In an adhesion 
contract . . . the assent is resembled rather than actual.  The printed 
words are not enough to disclose the expectations of the parties.  The 
court must look for that purpose to the full circumstances of the trans-
action whether the written words of the contract be ambiguous or un-
ambiguous. 
Interestingly, whether the consent arises through adherence or negotia-
tion, Missouri courts apply the same rules of contract construction that 
will implement as much as possible the “expectations which induced 
[the] agreement.”373 
  
Rehab. Hosp., 565 S.W.3d 260, 274 (Tenn. 2018); see generally Robert M. Lloyd, The 
“Circle of Assent” Doctrine: An Important Innovation in Contract Law, 7 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 237, 270 (2006) (explaining in-depth the rationale for 
the rule). 
 368. Sw. Petroleum Corp., 757 S.W.2d at 674 (quoting Parton v. Mark Pirtle 
Oldsmobile–Cadillac–Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 369. See, e.g., Lloyd, supra note 367 (explaining generally the rationale for the 
rule). 
 370. Id. at 240.  
 371. Id. 
 372. Sw. Petroleum Corp., 757 S.W.2d at 674. 
 373. Spychalski v. MFA Life Ins. Co., 620 S.W.2d 388, 392–93 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1981); see also Estrin Constr. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 422 (Mo. 
Ct. App.1981) (“These [adhesive] terms are not the result of formal assent but are im-
posed. The other party does not agree to the transaction, but only adheres from want of 
genuine choice.”). 
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Still, other decisions hold that adhesion contracts are not agreements un-
der the traditional bargain model.  Regarding adhesion contracts, the prerequi-
sites for “[a]ssent and volition . . . are absent.”374  Another case observed that  
standard form adhesion contracts “are not, under any reasonable test, the agree-
ment of the consumer or business recipient to whom they are delivered.”375  Yet 
another decision concluded, “The contracting still imagined by courts and law 
teachers as typical, in which both parties participate in choosing the language 
of their entire agreement, is no longer of much more than historical im-
portance.”376  A fourth case even implicitly rejected the plain meaning rule, 
observing that “[a] court should disregard [the parties'] stated intent when it is 
contained in an adhesion contract.”377  These courts would seem to agree that 
“[t]he process of entering into a contract of adhesion . . . is not one of haggle 
or cooperative process but rather of a fly and flypaper.”378  
This other line of cases echoes Kar and Radin's refrain that contract law 
has lost sight of the moral premise that contracts are enforceable only when 
each side has voluntarily exchanged one item of value for another.379  Indeed, 
an Arizona case observed in language very close to Kar and Radin's critique: 
“To apply the old rule and interpret such contracts according to the imagined 
intent of the parties is to perpetuate a fiction which can do no more than bring 
the law into ridicule.”380  These cases indicate that an adhesion contract is not 
a sufficiently pure form of private ordering.  
Kar and Radin failed to mention that an influential tribunal has seemingly 
narrowed the ambit of the objective theory regarding the existence of mani-
fested intent.381  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
said in Williams v. First Government Mortgage and Investors Corp.: 
  
 374.  Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 147 (Pa. Super. 1985); 
see also Brokers Title Co., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 610 F.2d 1174, 1180 
(3d Cir. 1979) (“essence of assent is absent [in a contract of adhesion]”).   
 375. Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 605 A.2d 681, 686 (N.J. 
1992) (quoting W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control 
of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971)). 
 376. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Iowa 1975) 
(quoting W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of 
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971)). 
 377. Taylor v. E. Connection Operating, Inc., 988 N.E.2d 408, 411 n.8 (Mass. 2013) 
(quoting L.L. MCDOUGAL, III & R.U. WHITTEN, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 137 (5th 
ed. 2001)). 
 378.  Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 218 P.3d 486, 490 (Mont. 2009) (quoting ARTHUR 
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4, 13–14 (rev. ed. 1998)). 
 379. Kar and Radin, supra note 4, at 1161 (stating each party has an obligation to 
ensure that the other party is making a sound bargain). 
 380. Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 
399 (Ariz. 1984). 
 381. See Williams v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Investors Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 748 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000) (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 
(D.C. Cir. 1965)). 
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[w]hen a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, 
signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge 
of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective 
manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms.382   
Put another way, the court indicated that a reasonable party in the position 
of the seller, knowing that consumers rarely if ever read and understand the 
particular mass market contract of adhesion, would not necessarily construe the 
consumer's acceptance of the contract as manifesting concurrence.383  The tra-
ditional run of cases rarely, if ever, attempted to rebut this argument.  
Although generally a pro-merchant policy, one iteration of the duty to 
read doctrine384 comports with Kar and Radin's position.  In contesting the use 
of the objective theory of assent for boilerplate, the authors could have profit-
ably cited those decisions that lessen the duty to read either when the party 
signs an adhesion contract385 or when enforcing the duty to read would be “un-
fair under the circumstance” or cause “great hardship.”386  These courts further 
reason in an exception to the duty to read that “[w]here a contractual provision 
would defeat the ‘strong’ expectation of the weaker party, it may also be nec-
essary [for the merchant] to call [the consumer's] attention to the language of 
the provision.”387  Indeed, under New Jersey case law, an insurer must disclose 
to the insured those policy terms that might vary from the insured's reasonable 
expectations.388  Thus, Kar and Radin overlooked that some jurisdictions would 
lessen the importance of the duty to read as a barrier for consumers seeking to 
overturn their standardized adhesion contracts. 
Apart from these qualifications to the duty to read, even when the contract 
terms are unambiguous, Kar and Radin could have argued that a strict approach 
  
 382. Id.; see also Klos v. Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The concept 
of adhesion contracts introduces the serpent of uncertainty into the Eden of contract 
enforcement.  At the very least, it represents a serious challenge to orthodox contract 
law that a contract is to be interpreted in accordance with the objective manifestation 
of the parties' intent.”). 
 383. Williams, 225 F.3d at 748. 
 384. See Merit Music Serv., Inc. v. Sonneborn, 225 A.2d 470, 474 (Md. 1967) (“the 
law presumes that a person knows the contents of a document that he executes and 
understands at least the literal meaning of its terms”). 
 385. Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 785 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1976); see also Rempel v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 370 A.2d 366, 369 (Pa. 1977) 
(given the adhesive nature of an insurance policy the insured is under no duty to read 
the document). 
 386. Heller Fin., Inc. v. Hidwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 
1989) (internal citations omitted). 
 387. Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 785. 
 388. Bowler v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 250 A.2d 580, 588 (N.J. 1969). 
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marginalizes the importance of the circumstances surrounding contract for-
mation and performance.389  The last-cited decisions indicated that they will 
not apply the rules of contract construction in an “unreal” – or even “fictitious” 
– manner.390  This broader view of contract-as-transaction could support the 
position that, irrespective of dry words on inert paper, the particular parties in 
the full context of their living relationship never intended anything other than 
a free and open transaction.  Authority also exists for the proposition that the 
duty to read merely states a rebuttable presumption that cannot stand where 
dispelled by direct evidence that the person never read the document in ques-
tion.391  
Ultimately, the legal and policy argument can be made that, notwithstand-
ing the objective theory, when a court finds that a party has ignorantly signed 
a contract and the other party knows it or has reason to know it, then enforce-
ment of such a contract undermines reliance on the stability of commercial 
transactions.  As stated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 
The [problem is that the] written term asserted by one party is contained 
in a form contract, in circumstances where the party asserting the term 
has no reasonable basis to believe that the other party had knowingly or 
would knowingly assent to the term.  In such circumstances, enforce-
ment of the written term does not further the policies underlying con-
tract law, [which are] to “promot[e] and facilitat[e] reliance on business 
agreements.”392  
C.  Explaining Mutual Assent when Actual Agreement is Missing 
If various courts under the second line of authority accept that full-fledged 
agreement is missing for adhesion contracts, how do these decisions rationalize 
the absence of traditional mutual assent?  The possible obstacle here is that if 
there is no evidence of mutual assent, then there is no contract and no agree-
ment to enforce by either side.393  While Kar and Radin cited no case law either 
way on this issue, several decisions address this problem. 
  
 389. A number of courts give these extrinsic considerations important weight. See, 
e.g., Muchesko v. Muchesko, 955 P.2d 21, 24 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (in determining 
mutual assent, courts may consider the language of the agreement, the parties' conduct 
and other circumstances); Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 784 (Wash. 2004) 
(en banc). 
 390. Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 1976) (in-
ternal citations omitted); but see Rory v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 35 (Mich. 
2005) (applying plain meaning rule to adhesion contracts). 
 391. Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 791. 
 392. Sutton v. Banner Life Ins. Co., 686 A.2d 1045, 1052 (D.C. App. 1996) (em-
phasis added). 
 393. See Rory, 703 N.W.2d at 42 n.84; see also Muchesko, 955 P.2d at 24 (mutual 
assent is an essential element of any enforceable contract). 
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Some cases indicated that consent is merely assumed because the con-
sumer trusts to the good faith of the party using the form agreement and to the 
tacit representation that like terms are being accepted regularly by other parties 
similarly situated.”394  Citing the example of insurance policies, courts in an-
other line of cases have conceded that mutual consent is missing for adhesion 
contracts and that it is necessary to substitute the role of public expectations 
and commercially-accepted standards for ordinary standards for assent.395  Still 
other courts have asserted the merchant creates consent through de facto legis-
lation.  The argument here centers on the point that one predominant unilateral 
will – the merchant's – in substance, legislates terms to an undetermined num-
ber of persons rather than to just one individual; accordingly, these adhesive 
instruments are more akin to “[a] law rather than a meeting of the minds.”396  
What can we make of the cases conceding the consumer does not give 
sufficient assent but is bound nonetheless under consent-substitutes, such as 
public expectations, commercially reasonable standards, or de facto legisla-
tion?  Along these same lines another question may be asked: If a court rejects 
the plain meaning rule and rejects consent substitutes such as de facto legisla-
tion, is there a theory that accurately reflects the realities of adhesion contracts 
consistent with the traditional objective doctrine of assent? 
D.  Resolution of the Conflicting Decisions 
As compared with the majority view supporting bona fide mutual assent 
for adhesion contracts, the minority position challenging the existence of con-
sent for these contracts is not persuasive.  A Missouri Court of Appeals deci-
sion in the minority camp,  Spychalski v. MFA Life Insurance Co.,397 erred by 
stating that “quite apart” from the existence of any ambiguity, or the written 
words of the contract, “[t]he printed words are not enough to disclose the ex-
pectations of the parties.”398  The more logical position is that when the boiler-
plate is sufficiently comprehensive, which is almost always the case, the 
printed words and their plain meaning are generally adequate under the objec-
tive doctrine to establish mutual assent.  In effect, the minority line of decisions 
incorrectly requires proof of the consumer's subjective knowing assent.399  Ac-
cordingly, the minority position directly contradicts the established test, which 
  
 394. State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 274 (W. Va. 2002) (quoting 
Mitchell v. Broadnax, 537 S.E.2d 882, 898 (W. Va. 2000)) (Starcher, J., concurring). 
 395. Vargas v. Calabrese, 714 F. Supp. 714, 720 (D.N.J. 1989); see also Vasquez 
v. Glassboro Serv. Ass'n, Inc., 415 A.2d 1156, 1165 (N.J. 1980). 
 396. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960) (citing 
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189, 206 (2d Cir. 1955) (Frank, J., dissent-
ing)); Dunlap, 567 S.E.2d at 273 n.4. 
 397. 620 S.W.2d 388, 393 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
 398. Id. at 393–94. 
 399. For a specific example of this inappropriate subjectivist approach, see NAACP 
of Camden Cty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24 A.3d 777 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
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looks to “objective” manifestations of “voluntary mutual assent” through the 
medium of the contract document in the context of “an offer and reciprocal 
acceptance.”400  
Furthermore, the minority position overlooks the prevailing rule: “The 
only intent of the parties to a contract which is essential is an intent to say the 
words and do the acts which constitute their manifestation of assent”; agree-
ment does not “consist of harmonious intentions or states of mind . . . .”401  
When the parties affix voluntary signatures on a document that is unambigu-
ously presented to them and known to be a contract with no recognized defense 
that upsets the legal existence of joint assent, no real question exists as to mu-
tual assent. 
This last argument draws support from the theory that adhesion contracts 
with a knowing exchange of money for goods or services are contractual “bar-
gains” under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.402  The Restatement de-
fines a “bargain” as an “[a]greement to exchange promises or to exchange a 
promise for a performance or to exchange performances.”403  In this respect, a 
bargain is also commonly a contract where it provides “[a] remedy for its 
breach or recognize performance as a legal duty.”404  Therefore, when a con-
sumer pays for a service or product after signing what he understands to be a 
contract, even if there is some form of economic pressure or if the consumer is 
not fully conversant with all terms, it is difficult to contend under a flexible but 
realistic view of the law that there is no “bargain” – and therefore no “contract” 
– under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.405  
  
2011) (“Because arbitration provisions are often embedded in contracts of adhesion, 
courts take particular care in assuring the knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, 
and a clear mutual understanding of the ramifications of that assent.” (emphasis 
added)); see also Peoples Mortg. Co. v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 856 F. Supp. 910, 927 
(E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 400. Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 18 (1981) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)).  The 
courts commonly apply the conventional objective test to insurance policies, which 
courts have construed as a category of adhesion contracts. See, e.g., Harrington v. Cit-
izens Prop. Ins. Corp., 54 So. 3d 999, 1002 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); U.S. Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Fleekop, 682 So. 2d 620, 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
 401. Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also 
Moody Realty Co. v. Huestis, 237 S.W.3d 666, 674 n.8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (“The 
legal mechanism by which parties show their assent to be bound is through offer and 
acceptance.”). 
 402. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 403. Id.  
 404. See Daniel P. O'Gorman, Redefining Offer in Contract Law, 82 MISS. L.J. 
1049, 1054 (2013). 
 405. Sherman v. Lunsford, 723 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (“Although 
the parties may not have fully understood the legal significance of each and every term, 
they knew they were signing a binding contract.”); Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 
F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Form contracts, and standard clauses in individually 
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Besides reflecting the legal tenets of the objective doctrine – including 
the plain meaning rule and the duty to read and understand a contract – and 
meeting the criteria of an enforceable bargain per the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, the majority doctrine draws support from the strong policies of the 
sanctity of contract and the need for preserving commercial stability.406  It also 
implements the rule that, wherever possible, courts should strive to uphold, 
rather than to defeat, an otherwise binding contract.407  As the decisions recog-
nize, 
In the overwhelming majority of circumstances, contractual promises 
are to be performed, not avoided: pacta sunt servanda, or, as the Seventh 
Circuit loosely translated it, “a deal's a deal.”  This is an eminently 
sound doctrine, because typically. . . [A] court cannot improve matters 
by intervention after the fact.  It can only destabilize the institution of 
contract, increase risk, and make parties worse off. . . .408  
Therefore, where the issue is in doubt, the majority position is sounder 
than the minority rule because the prevailing test better promotes the funda-
mental values of the contracting system. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis is largely a doc-
trinal challenge to the courts and some analysts, a response is also appropriate 
based largely on doctrinal grounds.  Most prominently, the authors’ reliance on 
linguistics has little value for contract interpretation, and the shared meaning 
  
negotiated contracts, enable enormous savings in transaction costs, and the abuses to 
which they occasionally give rise can be controlled without altering traditional doc-
trines, provided those doctrines are interpreted flexibly, realistically.”).  If one were to 
take literally Kar and Radin's argument that pseudo-contracts are not contracts, then 
they would need to concede that the law should not recognize a remedy for a seller’s 
breach.  I doubt Kar and Radin would subscribe to leaving consumers in such a lurch. 
 406. See generally Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1460 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(emphasizing policies underlying sanctity of contract as a “civilizing concept”); Uni-
versal Studios, Inc. v. Viacom, Inc., 705 A.2d 579, 589 (Del. Ch. 1997) (emphasizing 
the “necessity of preserving predictability and stability in commercial transactions”). 
 407. See 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 
§ 32:11 (4th ed. 2019) (whenever possible courts strive to uphold a contract as to its 
validity); cf. Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S. 
49, 66 (2013) (“Because courts should not unnecessarily disrupt the parties’ [contrac-
tual agreement] . . . [i]n all but the most unusual cases . . . the interest of justice is served 
by holding the parties to their bargain.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 408. Specialty Tires of Am., Inc. v. CIT Group/Equip. Fin., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 
434, 437 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (citing Waukesha Foundry, Inc. v. Indus. Eng'g, Inc., 91 F.3d 
1002, 1010 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
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analysis proposal simply masks Kar and Radin’s dissatisfaction with the bal-
ance of market power as between merchants and consumers. 
The authors’ proposal, if adopted, would likely detract from established 
contractual theories of obligation, undermine some key evidentiary principles, 
impair freedom of contract and the duty to read, and create the likelihood that 
the American commercial system would experience widespread unpredictabil-
ity and uncertainty.  Unlike the authors, courts have regularly rejected the no-
tion that boilerplate terms are per se unfair or contrary to public policy.409  
Given that almost all courts regularly uphold standard form contracts absent a 
recognized bargaining defect, “[r]ational personal and economic behavior in 
the modern post-industrial world is only possible if agreements between parties 
are respected.”410  Kar and Radin's article did not appropriately consider these 
significant policies.  Because the accurate recitation of legal principles must 
support valid doctrinal and normative criticism of the contracting system and 
especially considering that courts already follow numerous pro-consumer doc-
trines, Kar and Radin have failed to establish that current law undermines mu-
tual assent. 
  
 409. See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
 410. Dearnley v. Mountain Creek, No. L–540–09, 2012 WL 762150, at *3 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. A.D. Mar. 12, 2012) (per curiam). 
68
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss3/7
